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Chronic poverty, stagnant transitions towards democracy and a free-market 
economy, ecological ruin, authoritarian leaders, and ethnic conflict are but a few of the 
conditions preventing the stabilization and development of Central Asia.  Regional 
stability will continue to be elusive as long as each of the countries in Central Asia faces 
internal development challenges.  This thesis examines the U.S. relationship with 
Uzbekistan, the strongest of the Central Asian states, to determine what assistance the 
U.S. could provide to help Uzbekistan in overcoming its internal developmental 
problems.  I argue that the U.S. must shift from the current policy of focusing on rapid, 
measurable democratic reform and become a determined partner in the process.  Using 
insurgency theory to understand the situation in Uzbekistan, I propose that the U.S. 
foreign internal defense (FID) framework, presented in Joint Publication 3-07.1, provides 
the tools necessary to secure U.S. interests in Uzbekistan, assist Uzbekistan with its most 
pressing concern, and establish the basis for the development of a responsible, democratic 






































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................1 
B. SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM .........................................................................2 
C. METHODOLOGY ..........................................................................................3 
D. CAVEATS.........................................................................................................4 
II. U.S. INTERESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA ....................................................................7 
A. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................7 
B. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY .........................................................8 
1. National Security Strategy to Protect National Interests.................8 
2. National Interests Redefined...............................................................9 
C. NATIONAL INTERESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA ........................................11 
1. Vital Interests .....................................................................................11 
2. Strategic Interests ..............................................................................12 
3. Important Interests............................................................................14 
D. POLICY EFFECTIVENESS IN SECURING NATIONAL 
INTERESTS ...................................................................................................16 
1. Our NSS in Central Asia ...................................................................17 
2. Evaluation of NSS ..............................................................................18 
E. WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY..................................................................20 
1. The Great Game II.............................................................................20 
2. Solidifying Relationships ...................................................................22 
F. CONSEQUENCES OF MISSING THE WINDOW...................................23 
G. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................24 
III. IMU THREAT ...........................................................................................................27 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................27 
B. BACKGROUND OF THE IMU...................................................................28 
C. CURRENT DISPOSITION OF THE IMU .................................................29 
D. IMU ACTIVITIES .........................................................................................30 
E. UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT...........................................................31 
F. UNDERSTANDING THE GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE.....................34 
G. EFFECTS ON POLICIES ............................................................................37 
H. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................38 
IV. U.S. ASSISTANCE TO UZBEKISTAN ..................................................................41 
A. DEPARTMENT OF STATE CONTROLLED FUNDS.............................41 
1. Policy Refresher.................................................................................42 
2. Freedom Support Act Funds .............................................................43 
3.   Other Funds ........................................................................................45 
B. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ENGAGEMENT.....................................46 
C. POST-SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 ASSISTANCE ............................................48 
D. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................49 
V. A FRAMEWORK OF U.S. ASSISTANCE .............................................................51 
 viii 
A. INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT .......................................51 
1. Four Interdependent Functions of IDAD ........................................52 
2. Four Principles of IDAD ...................................................................53 
3. Organizational Concept for IDAD ...................................................54 
B. U.S. FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE.....................................................56 
1. Applying the Elements of National Power.......................................57 
2. FID Tools ............................................................................................58 
3. FID Organization...............................................................................60 
C. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................63 
VI. ADAPTED FID IN UZBEKISTAN..........................................................................65 
A. POLICY IMPLICATIONS...........................................................................66 





4. Military ...............................................................................................73 
D. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................74 
VII.     CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................77 
LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................81 


















Figure 1. National Interests in Central Asia. ...................................................................18 
Figure 2. Relationships in an Insurgency (After: McCormick).......................................32 
Figure 3. Counterinsurgency Options (After: McCormick)............................................35 
Figure 4. Foreign Operations Assistance to Uzbekistan (Data compiled from:  U.S. 
Department of State, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2002) ......................................41 
Figure 5. Generic Counterinsurgency Planning and Coordination Organization 
(From: Joint Pub 3-07.1, p. C-4)......................................................................55 



































A. BACKGROUND  
The dissolution of the Soviet Union has led to a power vacuum in Central Asia, 
creating, on the geopolitical level, what many experts refer to as the “New Great Game.”  
Russia has continued to exert influence in the region; however, those efforts are 
increasingly met by international competition from a diversity of interests, including 
China, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel, North Korea, South Korea, the United States, 
and others.  Given the multiplicity of players involved in the “New Great Game,” it is 
apparent that endogenous political evolution of the countries in this region is all but 
impossible.  To further exacerbate the situation, in the past four years a significant 
internal threat to stability has arisen in the form of fundamentalist Islamic groups, most 
notably the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). 
Even prior to September 11, 2001 and the ongoing “War on Terror,” the Central 
Asian region was important.  Situated among five potential nuclear powers (Russia, 
China, India, Iran, and Pakistan), instability in the region could have profound 
implications.  Aside from instability, the perception of advantage by one of the nuclear 
powers in the region could easily upset the delicate balance existing among the other 
nuclear powers.  Competition occurs in the region for economic reasons also; the region 
is rich in the natural resources of oil, natural gas, gold, and uranium.  At the moment, 
U.S. interest in the region is centered on eliminating the threat posed by Usama bin 
Laden’s Al-Qaeda organization, and securing allies and resources necessary for 
prosecuting the “War on Terror.”  However, the U.S. also has enduring interests in the 
region in promoting regional security, halting the flow of drugs and weapons, expanding 
new markets for investment, and fostering the development of democratic societies. 
Uzbekistan lies in the center of Central Asia.  Bordering all four of the remaining 
Central Asian states - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan - along with 
Afghanistan, Uzbekistan also has the region’s largest population and largest military.  
The capital of Uzbekistan, Tashkent, was the hub of Soviet influence in Soviet Central 
Asia, resulting in a significant amount of infrastructure development and 
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industrialization.  As the strongest country in Central Asia, Uzbekistan should be 
considered the keystone state.  Although a democratic, prosperous Uzbekistan cannot 
guarantee regional stability, the converse, an authoritarian, unstable Uzbekistan virtually 
eliminates any prospect of stability and security throughout Central Asia and beyond.  
Needless to say, Uzbekistan is the focus of this thesis.   
B. SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM 
For the past ten years the U.S. approach to Central Asia has not been unified or 
focused.  The U.S. has been struggling over how and what to formulate as a policy while 
providing piecemeal assistance in the interim.  Haphazard assistance has been offered via 
military, security, economic, political, and social programs that are not tied to tangible 
goals or expectations.  Meanwhile, international competition for influence increases 
concurrent with the developmental establishment of internal governmental and social 
institutions.  In order for the U.S. to secure its national interests in the region, a 
comprehensive policy must be adopted.  However, problems posed by undemocratic 
post-colonial rulers, stagnant transitions toward market economies, and internal 
instability have made the adoption of a coherent policy difficult.   
Despite its ethnic homogeneity, a high level of literacy, a developed (albeit 
deteriorating) industrial infrastructure, and sufficient natural resources, Uzbekistan also 
faces daunting challenges given its economy, ruined ecology, and chronic poverty.  
However, the challenge that stands out as particularly aggravating is that posed by the 
IMU.  With the stated goal of overthrowing the current government of Uzbekistan and 
creating an Islamic state with sharia law, the relatively small and ineffective IMU is able 
to disproportionally affect the government of Uzbekistan.  The government is compelled 
to respond to IMU actions in order to create a stable environment for carrying out 
necessary reforms.  Yet, paradoxically, the government lacks the resources and 
institutional knowledge to implement any counterinsurgency strategy beyond that of its 
Soviet predecessor; which ran what amounted to a police state with massive internal 
security.  Massive internal security measures, in turn, damage the tenuous link between 
government and the citizenry that is necessary for the development of liberal, trustworthy 




This thesis is policy prescriptive in nature, arguing for increased U.S. involvement 
in Central Asia in general, with a focus on Uzbekistan in particular.  Additionally, this 
thesis argues for the adoption of counterinsurgency strategy as a means to unify and focus 
U.S. assistance to Uzbekistan.  The goal is to devise a program that will enable 
Uzbekistan to effectively counter short-term internal threats while laying the necessary 
groundwork for long-term development of the country that is compatible with U.S. 
interests.  The theoretical model for the thesis is foreign internal defense (FID) strategy, 
as contained in Joint Publication 3-07.1: Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for 
Foreign Internal Defense (1996).  The logical flow of the thesis seeks to answer the 
following questions:  Does the U.S. have sufficient interests to justify engagement in 
Central Asia, and Uzbekistan?  What is the primary threat to stability in Uzbekistan?  
What can be done to mitigate this threat, and is there a role for the U.S. to play in threat 
mitigation?  What are we currently doing to secure U.S. interests and stabilize 
Uzbekistan?  Can we be doing those things better and more effectively to accomplish our 
goals?   
In Chapter II I analyze what interests the U.S. has in expanding engagement with 
Central Asia. I do so by utilizing criteria designated in our National Security Policy.  Not 
only do I determine that the U.S. does have significant interests at stake in Central Asia, 
which we are legally obligated to secure, but also, I question whether the cornerstone of 
U.S. engagement policy in the region should be democracy, human rights, and a market 
economy, if the aim is to secure our national interests.   
Chapter III examines the effects of the IMU on Uzbekistan.  I argue that while the 
odds are strongly against the IMU being able to topple the government of Uzbekistan, the 
mere threat that the IMU poses paralyzes the government and essentially prevents the 
government from carrying out necessary reforms.  Although my analysis vindicates 
Uzbekistan’s approach toward counterinsurgency as a legitimate, albeit severe and 
inefficient, method of internal defense, I also offer a model for better understanding the 
effects an insurgent group has on the government and using this model, I consider other 
tactics available to Uzbekistan in its counterinsurgency effort.   
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Chapter IV examines the broad range of assistance that the U.S. has provided to 
Uzbekistan to secure U.S. national interests.  Although the various engagement and 
assistance programs are envisioned, planned, and executed with the best of intentions, 
their effects are diluted by the lack of a unity of effort.   
Chapter V sketches the concept of FID strategy as contained in Joint Publication 
3-07.1. I recommend this framework as a method to effectively achieve results in 
Uzbekistan.  The framework provides a philosophy and organizational structure to 
redress the unity of effort problems associated with our current assistance to Uzbekistan.   
Chapter VI proposes tactics borrowed from the FID framework that harness the 
various elements of national power – military, diplomatic, economic, information – in 
support of protecting U.S. interests in Uzbekistan, while also promoting the stable 
development of the country in ways compatible with U.S. interests.  These tactics are by 
no means comprehensive or infallible; they are intended to serve as examples for how the 
FID strategy can be operationalized to maximize return on our investment.  With a 
common goal, and clear understanding of how each individual program supports the 
desired end state, those in charge of each of the pieces can more effectively implement 
and adjust their programs.  Allowing for the argument that the IMU insurgency does not 
represent the most substantial threat to the Republic of Uzbekistan, the effectiveness of 
the overall FID effort will not be judged by whether or not the IMU is immobilized, but 
instead by whether popular support for the government and the pace of reform within 
government is enhanced.   
The seventh and final chapter is the conclusion, which summarizes the arguments 
made, and answers the questions posed in this introduction.   
D. CAVEATS 
This thesis is not trying to argue that strengthening U.S. ties with Uzbekistan 
through a comprehensive program is the answer to protecting U.S. interests and ensuring 
stability throughout Central Asia.  Rather, it focuses solely on maximizing the efficiency 
and effectiveness of U.S. foreign aid given to Uzbekistan.  To foster security and stability 
in the region requires a regional solution.  However, the general concepts of this thesis 
are applicable to every country in the region, with the next logical step being the creation 
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of regional cooperative mechanisms and ongoing objective analysis of regional issues as 
affected by competition internal and external to the region.  It is reasonable to expect that 
regional stability will continue to be elusive as long as each of the countries in Central 
Asia faces internal developmental challenges.  Therefore, the scope of this thesis is to 
provide a framework for attaining the precondition for regional stability – using 
Uzbekistan as the case study for illustrating the broader model.   
The concept behind, and research for, this thesis started prior to the terrorist 
attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C. on September 11, 2001.  Since the 
attacks and subsequent “War on Terror” much more attention has been paid to Central 
Asia and U.S. assistance to the region has dramatically increased.  It is important to 
recognize that the U.S. has interests in Central Asia that go beyond the current “War on 
Terror,” and that a comprehensive long-term policy is necessary.  For this reason, the 
thesis will largely discount the post-September 11th interests the U.S. has in Uzbekistan 
as well as the significant contributions that Uzbekistan has made, and can continue to 
make, as a U.S. ally in the “War on Terror.”  Since the point of the thesis is to argue for a 
more efficient engagement strategy in Uzbekistan, enhancing the thesis with post-
September 11, 2001 evidence only strengthens the argument.  In fact, there would not 
have been such a diplomatic scramble to secure Uzbekistan’s support immediately after 































II. U.S. INTERESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
It is almost inconceivable that an entire, new region of the world could suddenly 
appear.  However, the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 initiated such a 
phenomenon.  Regions of the globe, formerly treated as backwater provinces of the 
Soviet Union by foreign policy, acquired independence and stature and emerged as 
autonomous participants on the world stage.  The emergence of these new regions and 
countries in turn required the United States to diversify its foreign policy strategy from 
the bipolar focus of the Cold War.  In the ten years since the collapse of the Soviet 
Empire, the United States has been studying, formulating, and implementing policy 
toward these new regions in efforts to beneficially serve American national interests.   
Central Asia is one of these newly emergent regions.  The former Soviet 
Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan define 
the Central Asian region.  The United States has maintained a diplomatic residence in 
each country for the past decade and the dominant foreign policy positions which have 
emerged have included the promotion of democracies, transition to market economies, 
and compliance with international standards of human rights.  While these are noble, 
worthy goals, they are also ambiguous and not tangibly associated with the protection of 
national interests.  Therefore, it seems crucial to analyze what interests the United States 
has in Central Asia in order to assess the effectiveness of our policies in securing those 
national interests.  I intend to show that the United States does have significant interests 
in Central Asia, interests that current policies towards the region are not able to properly 
secure.   
However, the implementation of foreign policy does not occur in a vacuum.  
There are many players vying for influence in Central Asia, including Russia, China, 
Iran, Turkey, North Korea, South Korea, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, among others.  Not 
surprisingly, many of these countries have views on the development of the region that 
are not compatible with our national interests.  For this reason I will also examine the 
geopolitical dynamics in the region with an emphasis on how the multiplicity of players 
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are affecting development and what this might mean for the United States.  What I find is 
that, thanks to a deteriorating regional security situation, partnerships and relations in the 
Central Asian region are quickly solidifying.  Unless the United States increases 
engagement with the Central Asian states quickly, our opportunities to do so will be 
further constrained and American influence in the region will wane, along with our 
ability to secure our national interests. 
B. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY  
Theories of interdependence and globalization are appropriate for describing how 
events outside our borders can have direct and significant effects on our security and 
prosperity.  The end of the Cold War, and its associated proxy wars, has not diminished 
the need for our international involvement.  If anything this has only grown.  Despite the 
debates over the effects of globalization, the predominant paradigm throughout the world 
is that cordial economic and political relations between all countries in the world will 
benefit everyone.  Congress agrees: 
The Congress finds that fundamental political, economic, and 
technological changes have resulted in the interdependence of nations.  
The Congress declares that the individual liberties, economic prosperity, 
and security of the people of the United States are best sustained and 
enhanced in a community of nations which respect individual civil and 
economic rights and freedoms and which work together to use wisely the 
world’s limited resources in an open and equitable international economic 
system.  (22 U.S.C.)  
  However, in the area of foreign policy, the world is a complicated machine, with 
lots of moving parts, and this theory alone is insufficient for guiding policymakers.  Title 
50, Chapter 15, Section 404a of the U.S. Code mandates that the President of the United 
States must present a National Security Strategy (NSS) annually to Congress (50 U.S.C.).   
1. National Security Strategy to Protect National Interests 
The purpose of the NSS is to clearly state the administration’s position regarding 
the United States’ worldwide interests, as well as policy goals and objectives that are 
crucial to the country’s security (50 U.S.C.).  The requirement for, and format of, the 
NSS makes it clear that the United States must protect national interests with effective 
foreign policy and military force if necessary.  While this concept may seem intuitive, it 
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is worth highlighting the statutory requirement because the process of implementing 
policy to protect national interests is less well defined. 
 The most current publicly available NSS comes from the Clinton Administration.  
President Clinton defined our national interests in three categories: vital interests, 
important interests, and humanitarian interests (Clinton, 2000, p. 4).  However, the U.S. 
Department of State, in the most recent publicly available “doctrinal” publication, defines 
U.S. national interests in terms of seven functional categories: national security, 
economic prosperity, American citizens and U.S. borders, law enforcement, democracy, 
humanitarian response, and global issues (U.S. Department of State, 2000a, pp. 11-12).  
Each of these seven functional categories is further subdivided into several strategic goals 
that could, theoretically, be imported into one of President Clintons’ three categories of 
national interest.  To further complicate matters, members of the legislative branch of 
government are accountable to their constituents vis a vis the foreign policy process, not 
any clearly defined terms or categories.  However, a recent joint, bipartisan congressional 
commission concludes that, “Strategy and policy must be grounded in the national 
interest” (“U.S. National Security Strategy,” 2001, p. 88).  The commission’s categories 
of national interest, meanwhile, are: survival interests, critical interests, and significant 
interests (p. 89).   
2. National Interests Redefined  
Given the lack of agreement among these definitions and to retain a non-partisan 
bias, I am going to borrow from Charles Fairbanks, C. Richard Nelson, S. Fredrick Starr, 
and Kenneth Weisbrode, who authored the Strategic Assessment of Central Eurasia for 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and define national interests in terms of vital interests, strategic 
interests, and important interests (Fairbanks, Nelson, Starr, & Weisbrode, 2001, p. 93).  
Redefining national interests in this manner is in no way meant to impugn the intent of 
policy makers.  Instead, my aim is to retain some degree of consistency throughout this 
thesis.   
a. Vital Interests 
There is little ambiguity and therefore much consensus in terms of what 
defines vital interests.  According to Clinton (2000) vital interests are:   
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those directly connected to the survival, safety, and vitality of our nation.  
Among these are the physical security of our territory and that of our 
allies, the safety of our citizens both at home and abroad, protection 
against WMD proliferation, the economic well-being of our society, and 
the protection of our critical infrastructures – including energy, banking, 
and finance, telecommunications, transportation, water systems, vital 
human services, and government services – from disruption intended to 
cripple their operation.  (p. 4)  
The underlying point is that if left unchecked a threat to a vital national 
interest could directly and fundamentally change life as we know it in the United States.  
Therefore, it becomes incumbent upon policy makers to employ all the available 
elements of national power, including military power, necessary to counter threats to vital 
national interests.  While apparently straightforward, Clinton’s definition does allow 
some room for interpretation.  For example, alliance treaties are subject to debate, the 
“vitality of the nation” is a relative concept, and not even “crippling critical 
infrastructures” can be defined in measurable terms.  However, so far, policy makers 
have risen to the occasion and mobilized national resources in defense of vital national 
interests, albeit only after an incident has occurred most times.   
b. Strategic Interests 
The defining characteristic of strategic interests is that they are not vital; 
meaning that, if left unchecked, if a strategic interest were threatened, this would not 
directly or fundamentally change the American way of life.  However, strategic interests 
are important in that they may impact or affect vital national interests, or they may evolve 
into vital national interests on their own unless proactive measures are taken.  In dealing 
with strategic national interests, policy makers have some time and flexibility to secure 
these interests through various strategies implementing the elements of national power.  
Basically, strategic interests must be secured, but with a lower level of criticality than 
vital interests and a higher degree of concern for long-term and ancillary effects.   
c. Important Interests 
Important interests are those that the United States would like to secure, 
but which have a low probability of significantly or directly impacting on a vital interest.  
The effects of securing important interests range from economic benefits for specific 
sectors of the American public, to promoting American values, to assisting in 
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humanitarian endeavors.  While securing important interests earns the United States 
points in the “good guy” category, there is only an indirect correlation between an 
important interest and national security.  However, important interests can impact on the 
how and why of protecting strategic interests.  
C. NATIONAL INTERESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA 
National interests do not readily appear or clearly align themselves in easily 
defined categories.  They often reflect the bias of the group promoting the interest and are 
refutable when placed in a historical context and compared using a case study 
methodology.  Furthermore, the long-term effects of a specified interest are uncertain in 
every case.  Fueling the debate over the categorization of the interest and the corollary 
response is the fact that there is almost always a parallel cost involved, requiring money 
and resources.  In addition, interests are not mutually exclusive and, in many cases, they 
are actually intertwined.  Nevertheless, I will categorize the United States’ national 
interests in Central Asia for the purposes of evaluating the effectiveness of our NSS in 
Central Asia.  
1. Vital Interests 
a. Countering/Eliminating the Threat Posed by Groups Associated 
with Usama bin Laden 
Until September 11, 2001 it would have been laughable to argue that the 
United States had any vital national interests in Central Asia.  Fairbanks et al. (2001) 
plainly state that it is unlikely that a vital interest will appear in Central Asia during the 
next 20 years, and then only if: a) a hostile regional power emerges that is capable of 
targeting the U.S. with ballistic missiles, b) a large scale conflict ensues that drags in 
NATO or the U.S., or c) a regional hegemon that is hostile to the U.S. gains control of the 
region (pp. 96-97).  However, the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon 
have forced a reassessment of this view.  On September 20, 2001, President Bush 
mentioned the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in addressing a joint session of 
congress, the nation, and the world.  Given the IMU’s association with Usama bin Laden, 
President Bush clearly identified the elimination of the IMU as a vital national interest.  
The Central Asian nations have all willingly stepped up to support President Bush’s “War 
on Terror,” thus becoming involved with what is inarguably a vital U.S. national interest 
– the dismantling of Usama bin Laden’s global network.  As it happens, this vital interest 
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for the U.S. is also a vital interest for the Central Asian states.  Yet, allying themselves 
with the U.S. is not the only, or most palatable, means available to them to secure their 
vital national interests.    
2. Strategic Interests 
a. Maintain Influence in the Region 
It almost goes without saying that the United States has strategic interests 
in maintaining engagement in every region of the world.  However, on a prioritized list, 
Central Asia would most definitely not be at the top.  Nevertheless, failure to secure this 
national interest would not only adversely impact the United States’ ability to secure 
other strategic and important interests in the region, but also influence the outcome of 
vital and strategic interests in critical adjoining regions of the world, such as Europe, 
Asia, and the Middle East.  I’ll touch on the dynamic geopolitics of the region later, but 
in a region surrounded by four nuclear powers - China, Russia, Pakistan, and India - 
along with a potential nuclear power – Iran - it is imperative that the United States remain 
influential.  Securing U.S. influence in the region does not have to be as antagonistic as 
Ariel Cohen, a distinguished political scientist specializing in the post-Soviet Union 
region, suggests when he says that the U.S. must maintain influence in order to “deny one 
country or a group of countries, such as Russia and China, the ability to dominate the 
region to the exclusion of American presence” (2001).  However, when examining the 
geopolitical milieu, as I will later, there may be some merit to the intent behind Cohen’s 
admonition.   
b. Regional Security 
The issue of regional security is non-controversial in the sense that 
regional security is a strategic national interest for the United States.  Regional security 
encompasses three of the four strategic interests that Fairbanks et al. (2001) describe as 
being at stake in Central Asia: a) peace, stability, and independence of the region as a 
whole, b) containment of intra-regional disputes, and c) prevention of inter-regional 
disputes (their fourth strategic interest is proliferation of WMD) (p. 97).  In recent 
congressional public policy hearings by officials of the Bush Administration, regional 
security also appears as the first of three “core strategic interests of the United States” in 
Central Asia (Bond, 2001).   
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The priority on regional security is well founded.  None of the countries in 
the region can be characterized as having a particularly strong or efficient government.  
Although Tajikistan has been the only country in the region so far to fight a civil war, this 
trend cannot be expected to continue.  Nancy Lubin and Barnett Rubin (1999) describe 
the Ferghana Valley of Central Asia, which spans parts of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and 
Kyrgyzstan, as an extremely volatile region, susceptible to ethnic, state, or transnational 
conflict (pp. 12-14).  Instability in Afghanistan could also continue to contribute to 
regional unrest through refugee situations and the export of Islamist extremists.  Or the 
Afghan situation could implode into an inter-regional conflict involving India, Iran, 
Pakistan, or even China (Fairbanks et al., p. 97).  Each country in the region has 
communal security concerns, along with individual security concerns, that impact on 
regional U.S. interests.      
The high potential for conflict in the region, coupled with the probabilistic 
involvement of other nations, which would indirectly affect U.S. vital and strategic 
interests in adjoining regions, makes regional security in Central Asia a high-value 
strategic interest.  Furthermore, regional stability is an absolute precondition for the 
protection of our other strategic and important interests in the region.      
c. Control Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Along with the sudden dissolution of the Soviet Union went positive 
control over thousands of weapons of mass destruction (WMD): nuclear, biological, and 
chemical.  Kazakhstan inherited nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and strategic 
bombers, while nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons research, technology, and 
knowledge was dispersed throughout the Central Asian states (Gleason, 1997, p. 151).  
The lack of physical control that the states exercise over their territory, and the proximity 
of states and groups that actively seek acquisition of WMD capabilities, is of concern to 
the United States.  Only the success of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program 
and willingness of the Central Asian states to cooperate in the effort downgrades this 
concern from a vital to a strategic interest (Fairbanks et al., pp. 78-79).  Nevertheless, 
continuing emphasis must be placed on this issue to ensure that critical knowledge, 
research, and technology does not proliferate.   
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3. Important Interests 
a. Energy Development 
Not long after independence was granted to the Central Asian states, it 
became clear that they possessed significant energy resources which could now be made 
available to world markets.    Conservative estimates credit Turkmenistan with 8.1 trillion 
cubic meters of natural gas and over 700 million tons of oil (Gleason, p. 141).  
Meanwhile, Kazakhstan could potentially be one of the top five oil producers in the 
world by 2010 (Bond, 2001).  Other countries in the region are not quite as fortunate 
when it comes to energy resources, but exploration continues.  Uzbekistan has located 
sizable oil reserves in the Ferghana Valley that are currently earmarked for domestic use 
(Gleason, p. 141).  With the potential to export up to 2 million barrels of oil per day by 
2010 (Gleason, p. 141), Central Asia cannot be ignored as a significant oil-producing 
region.     
The United States’ interests in developing the energy resources of Central 
Asia are evident and include: a) ensuring market access for U.S. companies in the energy 
field, and b) diversifying reliance away from the Middle East.  Although energy 
development in Central Asia would improve our national security posture, this is not a 
strategic interest because development of these resources will inevitably happen, and 
market conditions will make the energy available for our consumption.  Still, it would be 
more beneficial to bring the energy to market on our terms. 
b. Political / Economic Reform 
A hallmark of American diplomacy is the promotion of democratic values 
and a free market economy.  As Clinton (2000) sums it up: 
The United States has sought to strengthen the post-Cold War 
international system by encouraging democratization, open markets, 
free trade, and sustainable development . . . For the first time in history, 
over half of the world’s population lives under democratic governance.  
Our national security is a direct beneficiary of democracy’s spread, as 
democracies are less likely to go to war with one another, more likely to 
become partners for peace and security, and more likely to pursue peaceful 
means of internal conflict resolution. (original emphasis) (p. 2)   
Promoting these values in Central Asia is a challenge.  Individuals who 
had served the Soviet State grabbed power and adopted nationalistic rhetoric in each of 
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the Central Asia nations following independence.  Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are the only 
two countries to have had a succession in leadership since independence.  However, none 
of the Central Asia nations has shown a proclivity toward meaningful reform.  Ariel 
Cohen (2001) characterizes Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan as having completely ignored 
the reform process, and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan as having backtracked 
away from reform after failed attempts to democratize and achieve market reform.   
Although Clinton’s policy appeals for the spread of “American values” in 
terms of strategic, or even vital, interests, political and economic reform truly fall out in 
the important national interest category; democratic reforms would certainly improve our 
relations and ties in the region, and market reforms would open new markets for 
investment and expansion.  However, the need for regional security and stability should 
still override our desire to impart our values and democratic governance, as the 
independent variable, has yet to prove itself as the determining factor that leads to 
stability.  Furthermore, as of yet, there is no recipe for success in transitioning from a 
communist, command economy to a democratic, market economy.  Nevertheless, the 
principles that Clinton espouses are extremely important and are worthy of our 
consideration if the region is to develop over the long-term, and certainly these principles 
align with the United States’ national interests.  
c. Environmental Concerns 
Throughout the former Eastern bloc the environmental legacies of Soviet 
rule are widespread.  Central Asia is no exception.  Years of mismanaging the upstream 
diversions of the two major rivers in the region, the Amu and Syr, to support inefficient 
irrigation has led to the near-destruction of the Aral Sea, which has lost nearly 50% of its 
surface size since 1960 (Gleason, p. 19).  Addressing this issue will require and promote 
regional cooperation to apportion water rights, alleviate the suffering of those 
immediately affected by the disaster, arrest further degradation, and improve the 
efficiency of irrigation and agriculture throughout the region.   
Kyrgyzstan is home to 23 uranium dumps with few environmental 
controls.  The effects from the inoperable drainage systems at these dumps, along with 
their weakened foundations, could wreak ecological disaster throughout the Ferghana 
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Valley, which is home to 20% of Central Asia’s population and the source of a significant 
portion of the food for the entire region (Lubin & Rubin, p. 76).   
There are numerous other environmental challenges in Central Asia 
affecting the land and health of the citizens.  While none of them directly affects U.S. 
national security, they are all indirectly tied to our other interests of regional security, 
political/economic reform, and energy development, and there are U.S. organizations that 
are uniquely qualified to assist in clean up and other efforts.      
d. Combating Smuggling 
Central Asia is a major transit point for the opium produced in 
Afghanistan.  A noted scholar on the region, Ahmed Rashid (2002), describes how the 
drug trade in the region is inextricably linked to political activism and provides the 
money necessary to buy weapons (p. 229).  U.S. domestic efforts to combat drug use are 
intimately tied to international efforts to curb the production and transportation of illicit 
drugs.  This continues to be a priority effort for our government, and therefore is worthy 
of identification as an interest in Central Asia. Additionally, this interest is closely 
associated with regional security and political/economic reform because the corruption 
and networks created to traffic illegal drugs decrease the amount of social control the 
governments have over the populace while only further straining budgets as limited 
resources are required to focus on the drug trafficking problem.  Although smuggling, 
whether in drugs, weapons, or persons, is directly linked to our strategic interests and 
even our “War on Terror,” categorizing smuggling as an important interest recognizes 
that individuals may participate in this activity merely as a matter of survival.  So, 
combating smuggling in Central Asia really requires a twofold approach.  Securing our 
vital and strategic interests (eliminating the threat posed by groups associated with 
Usama bin Laden and regional security) will go to great lengths to stop the flow of 
smuggled goods and decrease the opportunity to smuggle, while addressing smuggling as 
an important interest will address the underlying factors. 
D. POLICY EFFECTIVENESS IN SECURING NATIONAL INTERESTS 
My listing of United States national interests in Central Asia is undoubtedly 
incomplete.  However, the major interests have been identified and categorized, so that an 
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accurate assessment of our NSS in Central Asia can be made.  Any unidentified interests 
are, in most cases, subordinate to the national interests that I have highlighted. 
1. Our NSS in Central Asia  
Our NSS in Central Asia is embedded within our regional approach to Europe and 
Eurasia.  The guiding principle is the promotion of democratic values over the long-term.  
The Clinton Administration (2000) summarizes the overall strategy. 
Our engagement also helps frame the key choices that only the peoples of 
the former Soviet Union and their leaders can make about their future, 
their role in world affairs, and the shape of their domestic political and 
economic institutions.  Our strategy utilizes a long-term vision for the 
region, recognizing that this unprecedented period of transition will take 
decades, if not generations to complete.  (p. 40)   
In order to accomplish this strategy, Clinton cites several initiatives that support 
the overall goal of a democratic, free market region.  These include: assistance to 
improve the electoral process; assistance to create a legal infrastructure; academic 
exchanges; and strengthening civil society through grassroots organizations, 
entrepreneurs, and an independent media (Clinton, 2000, pp. 44-45).  The Bush 
Administration has echoed the same sentiments regarding its goals for the region:  “The 
overarching goal of U.S. policy in Central Asia is to see these states develop into stable, 
free-market democracies” (Bond, 2001).    
In keeping with the NSS, the U.S. Congress has taken steps to achieve our goals 
in Central Asia.  Assistance provided to the newly independent states of the Soviet Union 
originally fell under the 1992 Freedom Support Act.  In order to disassociate assistance to 
the Central Asian and Southern Caucasus regions from our foreign policy goals for 
Russia, the Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999 was enacted.  “The goal of the United States 
should be to promote economic and democratic reforms in the region while helping to 
develop oil and gas resources in a manner that is beneficial to all states in the region” 
(Senate Report 106-45, 1999).  The Department of State, representing the administration, 
responded positively to this legislation, recognizing the value of creating a regional focus, 
and stating that the Act “provides a useful framework for U.S. interests in the Southern 
Caucasus and Central Asia” (Senate Report 106-45, 1999).     
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2. Evaluation of NSS 
Given our national interests in Central Asia, summarized below in Figure 1 
(National Interests in Central Asia), how does our NSS stack up? 
 
 
Figure 1.   National Interests in Central Asia. 
 
 As far as the newly emergent vital interest is concerned it is much too early to 
judge.  The Bush Administration is feverishly working to maintain an allied coalition for 
the “War on Terror,” and the Central Asian states have thus far pledged full cooperation.  
The results of our efforts to secure this vital national interest are likely to profoundly 
change the dynamics of our engagement and NSS in the region.  Evenso, the 
effectiveness of our past policies should shed light on what may or may not work well in 
the future.  
 As made clear in Clinton’s NSS and in statements by the Bush administration, the 
guiding principle in Central Asia is the promotion of democratic values and a free market 
economy.  Nor is this a recent phenomenon.  Immediately following the breakup of the 
Soviet Union in 1991, Secretary of State James Baker made a trip to Central Asia to let 
the leaders of the newly independent republics know that the United States “linked U.S. 
diplomatic recognition to the observance of human rights, the adoption of market-
oriented economic reforms, and the establishment of democratic institutions” (Gleason, p. 
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151).  However, from the perspective of U.S. interests, democratic and economic reforms 
are only of secondary importance.  In theory, we should be able to more easily secure our 
strategic interests in a democratic, free-market society.  However, the reality is we do not 
have that luxury.  The Central Asia states are emerging from 70 years of Soviet 
authoritarian rule.  Even the Clinton administration (2000) admitted that our hoped-for 
“transition will take decades, if not generations to complete” (p. 40).  Is it responsible, 
then, to postpone securing our strategic national interests for “generations,” while we 
wait for an open society to, maybe, develop?  
 Helping develop a democratic Central Asia is not in and of itself misguided.  But 
making democratic and market reform, and the observance of human rights, a 
precondition for engagement in the region may be a mistake.  The Silk Road Strategy Act 
seeks to link the amount of assistance we provide to results in democratic and economic 
reforms.  Furthermore, Section 499E of the Act “specifically prohibits assistance to the 
government of any country that ‘is engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of 
internationally recognized human rights’” (Senate Report 106-45, 1999).  In the Central 
Asian context, these represent significant impediments to engagement.  They hamper our 
ability to secure the kind of influence in the region that would help us satisfy our strategic 
needs along with our important interests of energy development, the environment, and 
combating smuggling.  An international non-governmental organization, Human Rights 
Watch – Helsinki, has recently called for Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to be designated 
countries of particular concern.  However, the Administration has so far successfully 
resisted (“U.S. Policy in Central Asia,” 2001).  Designating these countries as countries 
of particular concern would cut off all but humanitarian assistance, forcing us to halt 
meaningful engagement, abdicating any influence we have, and essentially abandoning 
both Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan when they need us most and when our influence can 
be most effective.   
 Our NSS toward the region can, and undoubtedly will, evolve.  The “War on 
Terror” is already changing the way the region is viewed.  Representative Joseph R. Pitts 
(Pennsylvania) recently commented on our past policy toward the region and the need to 
change: 
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United States foreign policy toward the region has been one that 
emphasizes a stand back and watch approach.  I do not think that it has 
been as successful as it could have been.  I think we can still effect 
positive change in the region by engaging these countries.  I think we must 
work with the leaders of the countries and build bridges with them, both 
economically and politically.  I think we must let them know that the 
United States is not going to turn a blind eye to the region.  We need to 
show them we do care about their stability, their economic growth, and 
engage them in all aspects.  (“U.S. Policy in Central Asia,” 2001) 
Accomplishing this will require a change in the laws as well as a change in philosophy.  
For instance, to begin with, if we are serious about engagement, then instead of making 
the adoption of American values a prerequisite to substantial assistance we should 
identify Central Asians’ most crucial concerns and focus on creating responsible, 
accountable solutions to these problems.  Such an approach serves several purposes.  
First, it would mitigate the primary obstacle to democratic reform, which is regional 
security.  By taking away leaders’ otherwise valid excuse we would help halt their drift 
toward authoritarianism.  Second, in the process of meaningful engagement with tangible 
results, our influence would increase with all sectors of society.  Third, with increased 
influence, we can more effectively secure our national interests.   
E. WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY 
In the case of countries that are not closely associated with our vital interests, it 
must be relatively common that our NSS, or policy goals, do not support our national 
interests.  Surely this is not the first time that well-intentioned policies are 
counterproductive in light of our overarching security goals.  However, it is important in 
an analysis to put everything in the proper context, and the context of our diplomatic 
efforts in Central Asia is a diverse geopolitical playing field.   
1. The Great Game II 
Since 1991, the competition for influence in Central Asia has been dubbed “The 
New Great Game,” after a term Rudyard Kipling originally coined in his 1912 novel Kim 
and that Peter Hopkirk expounded on in his 1994 work The Great Game.  These 
references describe Russian and British competition for control over the region in the late 
18th and early 19th centuries.  The modern day parallel is apt, but includes a much larger 
and more diverse set of players. 
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The players with the most at stake in “The New Great Game” are those who 
border the region.  Russia, China, and Iran are competing for economic and security 
reasons.  Russia and China desperately need to stabilize Central Asia in order to protect 
the integrity of their most vulnerable borders.  Russia wants to maintain its loosening grip 
on the economy it once monopolized, while China seeks entrée into this new, 50 million 
person strong market that is no longer subject to Beijing-Moscow negotiations.  Iran, 
meanwhile, is concerned about other outsiders’ desires to militarize the region in the 
name of regional security; any such moves it considers a threat to its Islamic regime.  
However, Iran also views cooperation with Russia as a means to possibly improve its 
relations with the West (Fairbanks et al., pp. 71-81).  Thus, competing interests make 
Central Asia a potential battle zone and with no clear way to satisfy all these diverse 
concerns, relationships among the external players in the region are bound to remain 
volatile. 
The primary security threats in the region emanate from Afghanistan and 
Pakistan.  Both countries played a role in supporting the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) 
in the Tajik Civil War (1992-1997) with the hopes of securing a “friendly,” Islamic 
government to their north.  Both countries also support the current most serious security 
threat to the region, the IMU.  While Central Asia is predominantly Muslim, most Central 
Asians’ theological roots are in Sufism and Jadidism, which offer vastly different 
interpretations of Islam from Wahabbism, to which the Islamists in the region are most 
closely associated.  Recent involvement by Afghani and Pakistani Islamist groups, as 
well as proponents of the Wahabbi doctrine from Saudi Arabia, has led to an intense 
mistrust of all Muslim outsiders by regional governments, as well as the governments of 
Russia, China, and Iran (Rashid, 2001c, pp. 45-46).   
At the same time, of course, the centrality of Pakistan in the security problems of 
Central Asia encourages involvement by India, a nuclear power with restive religious 
groups and malevolent desires toward the government of Pakistan.  Other countries’ 
involvement is more varied.  Turkey (a NATO member) claims to have significant 
historic ties to the region but is primarily interested in developing export routes for 
Central Asian oil that would transit through Turkey.  It also competes to secure a stake in 
Turkmenistan’s natural gas reserves for domestic consumption purposes (Fairbanks et al., 
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pp. 82-83).  The Gulf States serve as the primary transshipment point for high-quality 
foreign goods into Central Asia, and also profess an ideological interest in assisting the 
development of new, Muslim societies (Fairbanks et al. p. 89).  Israel is quickly building 
ties with Central Asia for economic reasons, to gain Muslim allies in the United Nations, 
and to check Iranian influence (Fairbanks et al. pp. 89-91).  Japan, North Korea, South 
Korea, and various European countries are mostly interested in Central Asia for 
economic reasons.   
While worthy of years more study, it seems fair to say that the relationships being 
formed in Central Asia are complex and dynamic.  In such an unstable environment it is 
nearly impossible to predict how things might shake out.  It is important to note, though, 
that the United States is the only external player that is concerned with democratic 
evolution.  Beyond its national interests, the United States cannot help but have a 
significant stake in “The New Great Game” given the involvement of the nuclear powers 
of Russia, China, Pakistan, India, and possibly Iran.  
2. Solidifying Relationships  
Since independence, the Central Asian states have gone about asserting their 
independence in various ways with varying degrees of success.  The overriding factor in 
their attempts to assert their autonomy has been from relations with the major adjacent 
military powers of Russia and China.  Each of the Central Asian states has reached out to 
the United States as a counterbalancing force and for assistance in attaining complete 
autonomy from Russia (Hunter, 1996, pp. 169-170).  As I have already pointed out, we 
have essentially rebuffed these efforts by making substantive democratic reform a 
precondition to meaningful assistance.   
Uzbekistan is undeniably the strongest state in the region.  Surrounded by other 
Central Asian nations, Uzbekistan has been seen as an independent “island of stability 
and a potential anchor” (Starr, 1996, p. 80).  Until recently, President Karimov has 
consistently refused to adhere to Moscow’s directives, and has not participated in any 
military-political blocs, because, in his words, “We do not want a return to old times 
[Soviet Union],” (“Uzbekistan Will Not Join Military-Political Blocs”, 2001).  However, 
recent events raise question about Uzbekistan’s ability to continue to avoid domination 
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by Russian and Chinese interests given Karimov’s government’s concerns regarding the 
existence and activities of the IMU. 
On June 14, 2001, Uzbekistan joined the Shanghai Five, a cooperative 
arrangement among China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.  Uzbekistan 
had avoided inclusion in the group for years.  Renamed the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO), this body’s stated goals are “confronting Islamic radical 
fundamentalism and promoting economic development” (Cohen, 2001).  Uzbekistan 
joined the SCO to gain assistance in defeating Islamists in the region since its unilateral 
efforts at counterinsurgency were largely unproductive.  Russian and Chinese 
participation in the SCO almost certainly ensures that individual concerns of the less 
powerful Central Asian states will be dwarfed by the interests of Russia and China.  To 
further exacerbate the situation, shortly after Uzbekistan signed on with the SCO, the 
presidents of Russia and China signed a treaty for Good Neighborliness, Friendship, and 
Cooperation, the first agreement between the two countries since 1950 (when Mao 
Zedong and Joseph Stalin signed an anti-Western alliance treaty) (Cohen, 2001).   
While not immediately threatening to United States interests, these two events 
signal a shift in Eurasian and Central Asian alliances and the balance of power in the 
region.  With Uzbekistan, the strongest and most independent country in the region, 
submitting to Russian and Chinese pressure there is no doubt as to the political 
allegiances of the other countries in the region.  It is safe to assume that, prior to 
September 11, 2001, the window of opportunity for United States involvement in the 
region was fast closing, despite the fact that countries in the region sought out a 
relationship with us as a pro-active, stabilizing counterbalance to Russian and Chinese 
pressure.  
F. CONSEQUENCES OF MISSING THE WINDOW 
After analyzing the United States’ vital, strategic, and important interests in the 
region, the consequences of being shut out should now be obvious.  Ironically, the 
creators of the Silk Road Strategy Act foresaw such a possibility: 
It is not inconceivable that, in failing to act, the United States would miss 
an opportunity to secure the independence of states that, in the worst 
circumstance, could prove to be the building blocks of a hostile, regional 
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empire reproducing the threat and tensions of the Cold War.  (Senate 
Report 106-45, 1999) 
Ariel Cohen does not necessarily conclude that we are on the verge of another Cold War, 
but he is convinced that: 
These two regional giants [Russia and China] are positioning themselves 
to define the rules under which the United States, the European Union, 
Iran, and Turkey will be allowed to participate in the strategically 
important Central Asian region. (2001) 
Russian and Chinese dominance of Central Asia creates three conditions that 
should be of utmost concern to the United States.  First, is the inability of the United 
States to independently secure its national interests in the region.  In this scenario, the 
United States would have to meet the conditions set by the Russians and Chinese in order 
to secure national interests in Central Asia.  This would fundamentally change the 
dynamics of our diplomatic efforts throughout Europe and Asia, and arguably the world.  
Second, Russian and Chinese dominance of the region nearly guarantees that the United 
States would have to abandon its long-term goal of promoting democratic governance in 
Central Asia.  This would impact not only our ability to promote democratic values 
elsewhere, but would also adversely affect Central Asia’s free market potential, and 
hence the global economy, as well as international recognition of the importance of 
respect for human rights.  Third, while the Russians and Chinese can be expected to 
significantly improve regional security in the near-term, any forceful action they take will 
produce the potential for conflict in the mid- to long-term.  Russian and Chinese 
dominance only increases pressure on Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran.  Given 
this, any number of scenarios involving the use of military force to secure local regional 
interests can be conceived.  And with Turkey as a NATO partner, and Pakistan and Iran 
(potentially) as nuclear powers, the United States would undoubtedly get pulled into the 
conflict.  
G. CONCLUSION 
Central Asia is important.  It may not be the most important region of the world, 
but the United States cannot afford to ignore its significance.  The proper way to view 
engagement with Central Asia is through the protection of our national interests, as 
mandated by federal law.  In securing our national interests we will gain influence in the 
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region and set an example for other countries to emulate.  It is important to understand 
the realities confronting the Central Asian states.  They have no experience with 
democratic governance and free-market economies, and these transitions cannot be 
expected to occur overnight.  What these nations desperately need is reliable assistance to 
help them address their immediate concerns while receiving consistent support in what 
will be a long transition.  However, our current policies of making assistance contingent 
upon rapid, measurable democratic and economic reforms are not only counterproductive 
to our overall goals for the region, but jeopardize our ability to secure our national 
interests. 
Even before September 11, 2001, the window of opportunity had not completely 
closed.  The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has made 
some significant inroads and the Department of Defense maintains a small, low-level 
military-to-military engagement plan.  U.S. NGOs are also active in the region.  
Furthermore, our engagement is still desperately sought by the Central Asian states.  This 
fact alone is vitally important.  It is the means through which we could attain our long-
term goals if only we reversed our approach.  If we were to focus our assistance on what 
Central Asians regard as their critical problems, thus proving ourselves a dependable 
partner, we would have more influence when it came to securing our national interests in 
Central Asia while at the same time helping shape the region’s long-term political 
evolution. It is virtually impossible to achieve this when we demand democratic reforms 
up front.  Therefore, as we reassess our national priorities, it is necessary to take 
advantage of the geopolitical imbalance created by the events of September 11, 2001 and 



































III. IMU THREAT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Uzbekistan does not rank high on anyone’s list of stable countries in the world.  
The government of Uzbekistan has faced tremendous challenges in the ten years since 
gaining independence - chaotic economic conditions highlighted by a non-convertible 
currency, ecological disaster in the Aral Sea, a flailing transition to a market economy, 
desperate social conditions, deteriorating infrastructure, and the list goes on.  It is not 
trivial to observe that the government is still in power; this is a testament to its ability to 
govern.  Presumably, each year the government gains valuable experience in the 
execution of its duties, thereby becoming more effective.  Yet, the international 
community sees things moving in the opposite direction and criticizes the Uzbekistani 
government for increasingly repressive policies and decreasing effectiveness.  But, do 
increasingly repressive security measures really indicate that the government of 
Uzbekistan is losing its grip on power?  Or, can its apparent regression toward 
totalitarianism be explained differently? 
I intend to show that the threat posed by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 
(IMU), an insurgent movement with the stated goal of replacing the government of 
Uzbekistan, has significantly impacted the policies of the government.  Even though the 
actual threat of the IMU may be small and its chances for success even smaller, it has 
effectively forced the government of Uzbekistan to fully enforce the only 
counterinsurgency strategy it knows: internal security - Soviet style.  The effects of the 
internal security measures that have been adopted in turn affect the government’s ability 
to carry out other necessary reforms.  Thus, before accurately judging the ability of the 
government of Uzbekistan to govern, and likewise to serve as an effective American ally 
in the region, one must first understand the dynamic effects of the IMU on the 
government and the rationale behind the government’s current counterinsurgency 
strategy.  While nothing may fully justify suspending civil liberties and regressive 
economic reforms, understanding the dynamics involved provides a more accurate frame 
of reference for evaluating domestic events in Uzbekistan than simply blaming 
everything on an incompetent, insecure dictator.  Similarly, understanding the IMU-
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government-counterinsurgency relationship highlights what should be the focal point for 
all U.S. assistance to the country as the United States moves to secure its national 
interests.    
B. BACKGROUND OF THE IMU  
Although, the roots of the IMU can perhaps be traced back to Gorbachev’s 
glasnost policy, the first manifestation of insurgent attempts by current members of the 
IMU was in December of 1991, when independent Uzbekistan was still in its infancy.  
Tohkir Yuldashev, the twenty-four year old leader of a political movement named Adolat 
(justice), took control of the southern town of Namangan in response to official clergy of 
the city endorsing the candidacy of Islam Karimov for president (Lubin and Rubin, 1999, 
p. 48).  Assisted by a persuasive twenty-two year old, Jumma Namangani, Yuldashev 
maintained control in the Namangan region for several months.  It is estimated that 
during this time Yuldashev enjoyed the support of 5,000 activists and Saudi funds to 
spread his message in support of a strict form of Islamic rule, atypical to the region 
(Rashid, 2001c, p. 51).  Yuldashev enjoyed some success, as up to 50,000 people in the 
Ferghana Valley embraced his vision of Muslim self-rule (Lubin and Rubin, p. 49).  After 
three months, in March 1992, Karimov responded to this first challenge to his authority in 
typical Soviet manner, by criminalizing Adolat, initiating widespread arrests, and 
tightening police security.  While these security measures were effective, the seeds 
planted during this early insurrection remained dormant for several years. 
Escaping the crackdown in Namangan, Yuldashev traveled between Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey in order to improve his knowledge of Islamic 
movements, make important contacts, and raise money.  Yuldashev settled down in 
Afghanistan in 1996, where Afghan and Pakistani Islamic groups provided him with 
organizational assistance as he set about establishing the IMU.  One of Yuldashev’s more 
important contacts was Usama bin Laden (Rashid, 2001c, p. 51).  Jumma Namangani 
also escaped from Uzbekistan in 1992 and, like Yuldashev, sought to improve upon his 
revolutionary skills.  Perhaps due to his three years of experience as a Soviet airborne 
soldier in Afghanistan, Namangani seems to have been drawn toward conflict.  After 
leaving Uzbekistan, he commanded troops of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) in the 
1992-1997 Tajik Civil War (Rashid, 2001b).  He traveled throughout Afghanistan and 
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Pakistan, and spent a year in Saudi Arabia undergoing religious training and working 
with Saudi intelligence officials (International Crisis Group, 2000, p. 3).  Yuldashev and 
Namangani joined forces again in Afghanistan in the 1997-1998 timeframe with the 
stated goal of overthrowing the secular government of Uzbekistan; the IMU is their 
military force.  Yuldashev remains the political leader of the movement while Namangani 
commands the armed forces. 
C. CURRENT DISPOSITION OF THE IMU 
Aside from Yuldashev and Namangani, little information is available about the 
personalities within the IMU or about their organization.  It is widely reported, and 
logical, that a large number of the IMU militants are former UTO freedom fighters.  In 
addition to the former UTO fighters, reports frequently cite the presence of former 
Afghan freedom fighters, Arabs, Chechens, Uighurs, as well as ethnic Uzbeks.  Accounts 
of the size of the IMU vary depending on the source; however, it is widely agreed that the 
IMU has in the neighborhood of 5,000 active fighters, perhaps more.  The IMU conducts 
most of its organizational tasks and training within Afghanistan while being able to 
conduct limited operations from, and move somewhat unrestricted through, Tajikistan.  
There are credible links between the IMU and Usama bin Laden, but the extent of support 
that bin Laden provides to the IMU is not clear.  By at least one report, bin Laden has 
provided the IMU with two helicopters (Rashid, 2001a).     
In addition to the former Taliban of Afghanistan and Usama bin Laden, the IMU 
receives financial and equipment support from the remnants of the UTO in Tajikistan 
(who are officially recognized in the coalition government as a result of the peace treaty 
that ended that civil war). Internal recruiting/fundraising efforts take place in Uzbekistan 
(International Crisis Group, pp. 7-8).  And Iran, which never recognized the Taliban, also 
provides some degree of assistance as evidenced by the government-controlled media in 
Iran serving as a mouthpiece for the IMU (Iran Report, 2001).  Additionally, the lucrative 
drug trade in the region provides a means by which the IMU can raise funds internally.   
It is difficult to judge the level of popular or underground support the IMU enjoys 
in Uzbekistan.  The Uzbek government has arrested thousands in crackdowns on Islamic 
extremists; however, critics argue that the government has arrested innocent individuals 
not involved in insurgent efforts (LeVine, p. A1).  It appears that support for the IMU is 
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widely available in the economically depressed, politically isolated, religiously devout 
Ferghana Valley, which also spans parts of Tajikistan and the Kyrgyzstan.  The Ferghana 
Valley comprises less than 5% of the landmass of Uzbekistan while housing over 25% of 
the Uzbek population and also serves as the major source of food and water in the region 
(Lubin and Rubin, p. 35). 
In its first out-of-cycle nomination, the United States designated the IMU as an 
International Terrorist Organization, even though, thus far, the violence it has committed 
has been comparatively insubstantial and aimed only at the government  (U.S. 
Department of State, 2000b).  There are signs that the IMU may have larger ambitions 
than seizing control of Uzbekistan, or that the IMU is now appealing to a wider 
constituency given its reported name change to the Islamic Party of Turkestan (Pannier, 
2001).  The symbolism behind identification as a political party and the mention of 
Turkestan is worth bearing in mind.  Turkestan represents the ideal notion that the people 
of Central Asia, from the Caspian Sea into western China, can be united under an Islamic 
Caliphate.  U.S. military action in Afghanistan has undoubtedly disrupted and degraded 
IMU capabilities.  However, it is imprudent to assume that the IMU has been destroyed 
because it enjoys a degree of sanctuary in Tajikistan and could have escaped elsewhere, 
not to mention the likelihood that “sleeper” cells exist in Uzbekistan.  More recent reports 
indicate that the IMU is actively regrouping, recruiting, and rebuilding a logistical 
capability (McConnell, 2002).  In the final analysis, there is no reason not to believe that 
the IMU still exists in significant numbers and remains fixated upon its cause while 
searching for an effective strategy to achieve its goals.   
D. IMU ACTIVITIES 
It is an understatement to say that so far the IMU has failed to capitalize on its 
potential.  After ten years of conceptual development, and over four years of existence, 
the IMU has proven to be little more than a nuisance.  While some small-scale attacks on 
government facilities and assassination of government officials in the Ferghana Valley in 
late 1997 and early 1998 were probably carried out by the IMU, the first large-scale 
operation attributed to them is the February 1999 bombings in Tashkent.  In this event, 
six bombs exploded in the capital of Uzbekistan within an hour and fifteen minutes of 
each other at key government facilities.  Only an unplanned delay prevented the president 
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from being caught in one of the explosions (Lubin and Rubin, pp. 52-55).  Since the 
Tashkent bombings, the IMU has been involved in three fairly clumsily handled hostage- 
takings, including one incident in Kyrgyzstan involving several American mountain 
climbers (International Crisis Group, 2001, pp. 7-8).  Even though two of the hostage 
situations were resolved through the payment of ransom, operationally it appears that the 
hostage takings occurred due to chance contact with IMU forces and not as modus 
operandi.   
Instead, the primary operational pattern of the IMU has been small-scale, armed 
unit infiltration of Uzbekistan during the summer months, the only time of year it is 
feasible to move a military unit over land through the Pamir Mountains.  In 1999 and 
2000 the IMU was involved in a series of confrontations with Uzbek government forces 
in border regions throughout Uzbekistan.  It took the government forces several months 
to put an end to the various infiltrations of anywhere from 70 to 100 fighters who were 
sufficiently well-armed with sniper rifles, small arms, machine guns, and mortars 
(International Crisis Group, 2000, p. 4-5).  Border incidents in 2001 were small and 
isolated, but this is perhaps due to reports that the IMU was being employed along with 
Taliban forces in an offensive to destroy the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan (Kasabolo, 
2001) (“Uzbek Exile Forms Political Party,” 2001).  It is too early to gauge the level of 
activity for the IMU in the summer of 2002.  However, the “War on Terror” and an 
increased military presence in Uzbekistan and northern Afghanistan is likely to compel 
the IMU to adopt tactics different than those employed in the summer of 1999 and 2000.   
E. UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT 
How can the IMU, a relatively small insurgency in exile, pose a serious threat to 
the established government of Uzbekistan?  The answer lies in understanding the 
dynamics behind this insurgency.  Insurgency expert, Gordon McCormick (2001), 
provides a model for understanding the relationships involved in an insurgency.  
Depicted below, in Figure 2 (Relationships in an Insurgency), is the model that he has 
dubbed “The Mystic Diamond.”  The fundamental characteristic of the model is the 
interactive nature of the relationships.  Preconceived actions or strategies by any of the 
players are dependent upon the forces at play within the model, not the efficacy of the 





















Figure 2.   Relationships in an Insurgency (After: McCormick) 
 
The primary struggle in the case of the IMU and Uzbekistan is for popular 
support, located at the top of the diamond.  In this model, the main goal or strategy of the 
IMU is to gain popular support in order to expand the area of operations, increase the 
amount of inputs coming into the organization, and erode support for the government.  
The government is similarly competing for the support of the same finite population in 
order to extract the resources necessary to protect civilians and manage the affairs of the 
state.  At a macro level it is easy to see how gains in popular support by the IMU occur at 
the expense of the government and how this poses a threat to the government.  But, given 
the presumed size of the IMU, its activities, and exile status, the likelihood of the IMU 
gaining a significant percentage of popular support seems remote.  However, the dynamic 
nature of the relationships in this conflict can produce disproportionate results. 
For instance, in the struggle for popular support, the IMU enjoys some key 
advantages.  Even though, as Rashid (2001c) points out, the form of Islam that the IMU 
supports is not openly embraced in Central Asia, the IMU is able to exploit some existing 
fissures in state-society relations to gain support for its cause or, more importantly, 
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undermine support for the government.  To start with, the IMU seeks a relatively small 
amount of support from the people in comparison to the government.  As a newly 
independent state and underdeveloped country, Uzbekistan faces many challenges.  To 
meet these challenges the government is dependent upon the people to make sacrifices 
for the good of the country.  Taxes, materiel, people, patience, and unwavering support 
are some of the inputs that the government of Uzbekistan requires from its citizens in 
order to meet its obligations to them (see the upper, right-hand portion of Figure 2).  In 
contrast, thanks in part to outside sponsorship, the IMU requires only implicit support 
from the population in order to exist, although more support is certainly welcome and 
always sought.  The economic hardships in Uzbekistan make the situation ripe for people 
to grudgingly meet their obligations to the government while turning a blind eye towards 
insurgent activity.  When this occurs it perpetuates and even magnifies the threat of the 
IMU to the government.   
Additionally, through small-scale, isolated attacks on government infrastructure, 
the IMU is able to capitalize on another government weakness: its inability to provide 
security.  Since independence, Karimov has been fixated on the requirement to maintain a 
secure and stable environment in order to provide the conditions necessary for economic 
development.  His justification is the Tajik Civil War, after which various armed militias 
succeeded in gaining government recognition in a coalition government that has become 
a model of inefficiency (Gleason, 1997, p. 125).  From the Uzbekistani government’s 
perspective, at a minimum, the small IMU incursions expose a chink in its armor that 
adversely affects economic development and potentially represents a threat to the entire 
system, as was the case in Tajikistan.  In order to maintain popular support the 
government is forced to respond harshly to these attacks to keep its promise to provide an 
environment conducive to improving conditions.  However, through repeated attacks, the 
IMU is able to demonstrate to the people that the government is not able to stop the IMU 
activity, thereby enhancing the perception of IMU strength in the minds of the people.   
The IMU is also able to capitalize on the economic and social conditions in 
Uzbekistan to gain popular support.  The economic conditions in Uzbekistan are indeed 
desperate for many people, to the point that in many rural areas even maintaining basic 
sustenance is a serious problem (International Crisis Group, 2001, p. 13).  Socially, the 
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government has closed down all non-government mosques and, due to extended family 
networks, nearly every family in the Ferghana Valley has been affected by the mass 
arrests of between 50,000 and 100,000 people who are now in internment camps 
(“Uzbekistan: A War Waiting to Happen,” 2001).  The IMU is easily able to spread the 
message that the government is solely responsible for these conditions without having to 
provide any credible solutions.  This does not necessarily strengthen the IMU-citizenry 
bond in the mystic diamond, but it does weaken the government-citizenry bond, and that 
poses a threat to the government. 
There are many more examples of how the competition between the IMU and 
government for popular support magnifies the threat to the government.  Each example 
reinforces the criticality and frailty of the government-citizenry bond and highlights the 
legitimacy of the IMU as a viable threat.  The IMU’s near-term strategy seems to be to 
pursue continued weakening of the government because it has not yet attempted to 
consolidate political control of any areas within Uzbekistan, or made public any 
alternatives to the current system of government.  In fact, the IMU still faces a significant 
hurdle in gaining popular support.  McCormick describes this hurdle as the “rational 
paradox.”  Simply put, the rational paradox requires the insurgents to convince the 
population that they have more to gain and less to lose by joining the movement.  How 
the IMU intends to overcome the rational paradox remains to be seen.   
F. UNDERSTANDING THE GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE 
As mentioned several times previously, the government’s primary response to 
insurgent activity is increased internal security and mass arrests, precisely how the Soviet 
Union responded to numerous uprisings and terrorist activities.  Popular perception is that 
this type of government response is due to weakness and insecurity.  Many believe that 
the measures are radicalizing the population unnecessarily in response to an overstated 
threat (LeVine, 2001, pp. A1, A8), and others argue that the governmental reactions 
represent the real source of the problems (“Uzbekistan: A War Waiting to Happen,” 
2001).  While the observation is valid that the government’s repressive measures are not 
helping to build state-society bonds, the assertion that the government’s 
counterinsurgency strategy is invalid and is radicalizing the population is not supported 
by in-depth analysis.   
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Generally speaking, the government of Uzbekistan has six options for conducting 
counterinsurgency operations: they are depicted below in Figure 3 (Counterinsurgency 
Options).  In applying the mystic diamond model to counterinsurgency operations it is 
important to note that the strength of the overall effort is not based on the independent 
effect of each strategy, but the confluence of effects of all the strategies combined added 

















Figure 3.   Counterinsurgency Options (After: McCormick) 
 
Option “A” is the hearts and minds approach, extremely popular with stable, 
liberal democratic societies that are not facing a serious threat of their own.  In this 
approach the government builds its ties to the people by implementing democratic 
reforms, carrying out government programs that help the people, and becoming more 
responsive to the people’s needs.  This is a long-term approach that does not provide any 
immediate relief from the threat. In the case of Uzbekistan, Option “A” may even 
increase the size of the threat by providing money to the IMU in the form of government 
loans and programs, and by offering the IMU sanctuary in Uzbekistan enabling it to 
operate free from prosecution.  While ideologically the hearts and minds option has the 
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moral high ground and should be the ultimate goal, it requires some preconditions of 
stability in order to be effective.   
Option “B” is interdicting the IMU’s ability to connect with the populace.  This 
can be accomplished through high-tech surveillance and intelligence-collecting methods 
that compromise underground networks and identify collaborators with legally sufficient 
evidence or via massive internal security measures that make subversive activity 
extremely risky.  Lacking the resources to rely on high-tech equipment, the government 
of Uzbekistan is accomplishing Option “B” through massive internal security measures.  
This option is absolutely essential for eliminating the threat to the government in an 
overall counterinsurgency strategy and the government of Uzbekistan is aggressively 
going down this path.  The weakened government-populace ties are an unfortunate side 
effect of the government’s inability to pursue this mandatory option by other means.   
Option “C” is targeting the IMU with military force.  In armed confrontations the 
government forces have always emerged as the victor and have suffered minimal losses.  
However, the IMU does not have any readily identifiable armed forces in Uzbekistan.  
Therefore, this option is not a mainstay of the current counterinsurgency strategy and is 
unlikely to significantly affect the threat.  Likewise, Option “D”, interdicting the ability 
of the IMU to receive outside support, is not very applicable in this case.  Uzbekistan did 
not recognize the Taliban and cannot influence the support the IMU receives while 
members are in Afghanistan, short of invading.  Uzbekistan has attempted to apply 
pressure on Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to increase security in regions of the countries 
where the IMU is believed to operate, and has even conducted unilateral military 
operations on foreign soil.  However, the Kyrgyz and Tajik military and security forces 
are woefully under-prepared for providing security in the areas in question. 
Option “E” is to build sufficient ties to external supporters that can help combat 
the IMU.  Uzbekistan is the most prosperous and most stable of all the Central Asian 
states, which means other Central Asian states cannot provide the support necessary.  For 
developmental reasons Uzbekistan has repeatedly turned down inclusion in regional 
political-military security alliances, because, in Karimov’s words, “We do not want a 
return to the old times [Soviet Union],” (“Uzbekistan Will Not Join Military-Political 
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Blocs”, 2001).  Uzbekistan has sought U.S. assistance, but meaningful aid has been 
contingent on the types of reforms characterized in Option “A.”  Sufficient support from 
Option “E” does not appear imminent unless Uzbekistan is willing to subordinate itself to 
one, or more, of the major powers.   
The final option, “F,” consists of infiltrating the IMU organization or collecting a 
large amount of the right type of intelligence necessary to effect counter-organizational 
targeting.  While the government of Uzbekistan may be pursuing this option, the results 
of this option are always uncertain and cannot serve as the basis for a counterinsurgency 
strategy. 
Therefore, evaluating the options that Uzbekistan has in implementing a 
counterinsurgency strategy to eliminate the threat that the IMU poses yields: 
OPTION Feasibility  
      A  Not yet, need to meet preconditions  
       B  Yes 
       C  No 
       D  No 
       E  Uncertain 
       F  Feasible but uncertain effectiveness 
 
It should therefore come as no surprise that the government of Uzbekistan is so 
wholeheartedly employing aggressive internal security measures; it is literally their only 
option that will definitively decrease the threat.  How these limited options in countering 
a seemingly small threat affect policy comprises the rest of the story.  
G. EFFECTS ON POLICIES 
Having established that the IMU is a threat that the government must address, and 
that the government has limited options in dealing with the threat, the next question 
concerns the effects that the IMU has on the policies of Uzbekistan.  The most notable 
effect is in the area of foreign relations.  Since independence Uzbekistan has remained 
fiercely independent and has assiduously sought to distance itself from Russia.  In 1996 
Uzbekistan was seen as an independent “island of stability and a potential anchor” (Starr, 
1996, p. 80).  However, since 1999 Uzbekistan has been increasingly drawn towards 
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Russia and China for security reasons.  I have already discussed how Uzbekistan recently 
joined the SCO in order to gain assistance in defeating Islamists in the region.  However, 
I need to emphasize that the presence of China and Russia in the cooperative will 
undoubtedly affect Uzbekistan’s independent development - not necessarily towards 
democracy either. 
The IMU is also indirectly impacting Uzbekistan’s ability to institute democratic 
reforms.  As mentioned when discussing Option “A,” the civil liberties associated with a 
liberal democracy are inconsistent with the ability to mitigate a serious threat to the 
regime.  It is thus unlikely that the government will agree to democratic reforms until the 
security situation is stabilized.  The inability to institute meaningful democratic reforms 
also adversely affects the ability of the government to implement significant economic 
reforms.  Moreover, as a direct result of security concerns, border controls have been 
tightened, leading to increased regional tension, increased tariffs, and decreased trade.  
Ironically, the compounding effects of the inability to institute democratic and economic 
reforms could easily lead to regime instability.  This highlights the paradoxical situation 
into which the relatively small IMU is able to place on the government: the actions the 
government is forced to take to eliminate the threat could very well end up eliminating 
the government. 
H. CONCLUSION 
It is nearly impossible to definitively prove that the IMU is the primary or most 
significant threat to stability, security, and development in Uzbekistan.  Likewise, it is 
equally impracticable to propose that economic policies, authoritarianism, or something 
else is the primary threat.  The problems are all inextricably interrelated.  The reality of 
the situation is that the government of Uzbekistan is the internationally recognized 
sovereign authority of the landmass constituting Uzbekistan, and that government 
consistently seeks international assistance in dealing with the threat posed by the IMU.  It 
is, for the most part, the perception of the threat of the IMU that complicates the 
situation: the government feels that it cannot do enough, while outsiders conclude that the 
government is overreacting.  But, since the government is legitimately in power, the U.S. 
must deal with the government of Uzbekistan’s perception of the threat. 
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In American terms, the IMU appears to be an insignificant threat that could easily 
be dealt with by properly applying the tenets of the Internal Defense and Development 
Strategy (Joint Pub 3-07.1, 1996, pp. C1-C6).  However, by analyzing the situation in 
context it is evident that the threat that the IMU poses is having some dramatic effects on 
the government of Uzbekistan’s ability to implement any noteworthy reforms.  
Recognizing that the United States has strategic national interests at stake in Central Asia, 
the preconditions set by the U.S. of democratic reform and human rights accountability 
are counterproductive.  The logical focus of assistance to the region should be to help the 
government of Uzbekistan counter the insurgent threat.  Only in the process of assisting 
the government of Uzbekistan to defeat the IMU will the United States gain influence 
over the evolution of democratic reform that is necessary to stabilize the region, develop 
the economy, and protect American interests.   
I can legitimately be accused of oversimplifying the situation in regard to the 
internal security of Uzbekistan.  Other fundamentalist Islamic groups exist in Uzbekistan 
and the government is not completely free from blame.  Ahmed Rashid (2002) highlights 
the Hizb-ut-Tahrir as another Islamist group, with a significant following, intent on 
overthrowing the Uzbekistani government.  But I would submit the models provided here 
can serve as a useful tool for analyzing any insurgent effects on government and 
counterinsurgency actions.  A good counterinsurgency campaign plan should be able to 
effectively mitigate insurgent threats from a variety of sources while establishing the 
government as the legitimate bearer of authority.  Rather than focus on all the potential 
problems Uzbekistan faces – which are variations on the themes already mentioned - it 
seems more profitable to examine what the U.S. is doing and can do better to foster 
stability and security overall in Uzbekistan.     
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IV. U.S. ASSISTANCE TO UZBEKISTAN 
The United States government, through policy and action, has recognized the 
need to be engaged in Uzbekistan.  However, I argued in Chapter II that U.S. assistance 
has not been as effective as it could be in securing our national interests and I concluded 
Chapter III by arguing that countering insurgent threats would be a more logical focus of 
our assistance.  Therefore, prior to recommending an improved strategy for engagement 
with Uzbekistan it is necessary to have a basic understanding of past and current 
assistance programs.  I am not attempting to conduct a comprehensive audit of all the 
assistance the U.S. has directly and indirectly provided to Uzbekistan.  Rather, my 
fundamental purpose is to illustrate that the various well-designed, good-intentioned 
programs that the U.S. has created suffer from a lack of unity of effort and do not directly 
produce results that support U.S. interests. 
A. DEPARTMENT OF STATE CONTROLLED FUNDS 
The Department of State has programming and oversight responsibility for the 
most significant amount of assistance to Uzbekistan through the foreign operations 
section of the U.S. annual budget.  Figure 4, below, summarizes the total amount of 
funding authorized for Uzbekistan as obtained from the Congressional Budget 
Justification for Foreign Operations from FY 1996 through the FY 2003 request. 
Figure 4.   Foreign Operations Assistance to Uzbekistan (Data compiled from:  U.S. 
Department of State, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2002) 
 
Freedom Support Act (FSA) money accounts for the bulk of the assistance 
provided to Uzbekistan.  Money in the FSA account, for the most part, is used to fund 
USAID programs in Uzbekistan.  However, the FSA account is also used as a catchall 
FSA FMF IMET NADR PC CSD ERF Total
1996 8,905 293 1,095 10,293
1997 21,550 1,000 286 1,335 24,171
1998 20,450 1,550 457 42 1,257 23,756
1999(est) 27,610 1,650 485 901 1,714 32,360
2000 20,042 1,750 547 1,703 24,042
2001 24,800 2,445 494 330 1,830 700 30,599
2002(est) 28,890 207 1,000  899 83,500 114,496
2003(req) 31,500 8,750 1,200 1,200 1,298 43,948
 All amounts in thousands of U.S. Dollars.
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accounting classification to provide other humanitarian and security related assistance 
(U.S. Department of State, 2002, p. 49).  Foreign Military Financing (FMF) money is 
intended to increase military cooperation between the recipient country and the U.S. and 
NATO by enhancing interoperability in peacekeeping, search and rescue, and 
humanitarian operations while also providing funds to enable the recipient country to 
participate in Partnership for Peace exercises (Beckwith, 2002).  International Military 
Education and Training (IMET) funds increase military professionalism and demonstrate 
the role of the military in a democracy by bringing foreign students to U.S. military 
schools, sending U.S. training teams to a foreign country to conduct training, and 
providing English language training to foreign soldiers (Beckwith).  Nonproliferation, 
Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) funds comprise security 
related assistance that is not strictly military in nature.  A key use of NADR funding in 
Uzbekistan is the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance, or EXBS, 
program (U.S. Department of State, 2002, p. 341).  Peace Corps (PC) funding provides 
the resources necessary to operate PC programs in Uzbekistan.  The category of Child 
Survival and Disease (CSD) funds, provided in 2001, was merged into the Development 
Assistance (DA) account in 2002 to streamline the budget structure (U.S. Department of 
State, 2002, p. 19).  Uzbekistan does not receive any DA funds.  However, USAID, with 
FSA funding, operates programs to accomplish the intent of the CSD program.  The 
Emergency Response Funds (ERF), provided in 2002, were authorized by congress, in 
excess of the FY 2002 foreign operations budget request, in response to the September 
11, 2001 terrorist attacks.  The breakdown of the funds is: a $25 million increase to FMF, 
a $40.5 million increase to FSA, and an $18 million increase to NADR-EXBS (U.S. 
Department of State, 2002, p. 340).   
In order to illustrate the planned and desired effects of this funding I will examine 
the FY 2002 budget justifications for the Department of State and USAID.  These 
justifications were published prior to September 11, 2001 and represent the accumulated 
knowledge of almost a decade of foreign operations budget experience in Uzbekistan. 
1. Policy Refresher 
Going back to Chapter II, the guiding principles for our engagement with 
Uzbekistan are the fostering of democracy, transition to market economy, and honoring 
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the principles of human rights.  I have argued that this is not the most effective way to 
secure our national interests in Uzbekistan.  However, it is our current policy and has a 
direct impact on funding and programs provided to Uzbekistan to secure our national 
interests.  The Department of State FY 2002 Congressional Budget Justification for 
Foreign Operations for Uzbekistan carries an implicit warning: 
Internally, Uzbekistan remains an authoritarian state; it is in the U.S. 
interest to see it evolve democratically, with respect for human rights.  
Uzbekistan has also failed to move toward a market economy, hurting the 
country’s prospects for economic success and stability and impeding U.S. 
trade and investment.  (U.S. Department of State, 2001) 
This warning is intensified and the consequences explained in the FY 2002 USAID 
program for Uzbekistan: 
The unwillingness of the Government of Uzbekistan (GOU) to introduce 
market-oriented reforms in the financial sector has constrained economic 
recovery . . . Its authoritarian politics and state-controlled economy have 
stymied any transition, contributed to human rights violations and limited 
foreign investment . . . The lack of political will to undertake economic 
reforms led USAID to shift its assistance strategy focus from the macro-
economic level to the micro-and local levels, focusing on private sector 
development through education and training.  (USAID, 2001) 
 What has essentially emerged as the policy position for Department of State- 
controlled funds is to forgo meaningful engagement with the government of Uzbekistan 
and adopt a grassroots approach to push for government reform by developing an 
effective civil society – an outside-in approach.  As I will explain below, some of the 
Department of State-controlled funds are provided to the government of Uzbekistan to 
shore up glaring deficiencies in security.  However, there is not a determined effort to 
assist the government of Uzbekistan in improving its performance.   
2. Freedom Support Act Funds 
As evident in Figure 4, the vast majority of assistance to Uzbekistan comes from 
the FSA.  USAID accounts for all of the FSA funds in its FY 2002 Program, stating that 
$10 million in FSA funding is transferred to other U.S. Government agencies (USAID).  
This $10 million is accounted for in the State Department Congressional Budget 
Justification for FY 2002.  Generally speaking, the State Department says that this money 
is used to fund an array of security and humanitarian programs.  On the security side, the 
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money funds programs to prevent the proliferation of WMD, improve border security, 
and to train law enforcement personnel.  On the humanitarian side, the money is used to 
provide “scarce medical supplies and pharmaceuticals, clothing and some food, much of 
which is provided directly to institutions such as orphanages, retirement homes, etc.” 
(U.S. Department of State, 2001).   
The remainder of the FSA assistance is provided through USAID, which manages 
five separate activities in Uzbekistan.  The first activity is the “Improved Environment for 
the Growth of Small and Medium Enterprises,” whose aims are to: a) provide resource 
materials, training, and research opportunities to economics and business curricula in 
universities to create subject matter experts grounded in modern theory, b) offer 
entrepreneurs basic business education and develop business associations and advocacy 
groups, and c) encourage micro-credit activity by providing technical assistance and 
advisory services for new small businesses.  The overall goal is to “improve the business 
environment to stimulate growth of small and medium enterprises” (USAID) 
The second USAID activity is the “Improved Management of Critical Natural 
Resources, including Energy.”  With this, USAID plans to improve the management of 
natural resources, improve the policy and regulatory frameworks controlling natural 
resources, and increase public awareness concerning the benefits of efficient natural 
resources management.  To accomplish these goals USAID, in coordination with other 
international organizations, assists low-level natural resource management officials in 
Uzbekistan to leverage technology to more efficiently manage natural resources.  USAID 
also lobbies for regional cooperation on trans-national issues (USAID). 
The third USAID activity is “Strengthened Democratic Culture among Citizens 
and Targeted Institutions.”  The premise here is that increasing awareness of democracy 
at a grassroots level will increase the pressure on the governing elites to speed up the 
reform process in line with democratic principles.  To accomplish this, USAID provides 
technical assistance to develop more effective civic organizations, independent media and 
media organizations and, increase public participation in the decision making process, 
and to improve the legal skills of lawyers and judges.  This activity is currently focused 
45 
on improving conditions at the local level, although technical assistance to improve 
media reporting also has effects at the national level.   
The fourth USAID activity is “Increased Utilization of Quality Primary Health 
Care for Select Populations.”  The overall goal of this activity is to help Uzbekistan 
transition from a centralized, state-run curative health care system to a more effective 
primary health care system focused on preventative care.  To accomplish this, USAID is 
directly engaged with the government of Uzbekistan through the Ministry of Health to 
provide retraining to health care professionals, upgrade laboratory and clinical skills, and 
improve the regulatory and policy frameworks regarding health care.  USAID also 
provides technical assistance to increase public awareness of personal health care rights 
and responsibilities (USAID). 
The fifth, and final, activity that USAID manages in Uzbekistan falls under the 
title “Cross-Cutting Programs.”  This is essentially the enabler and monitor of all USAID 
activity in Uzbekistan.  Under this activity USAID provides the training and exchanges 
necessary to make the other activities as effective as possible, while also providing the 
resources necessary to manage and evaluate the other four activities (USAID).   
3.   Other Funds 
FMF funds for FY 2002, owned and allocated by the Department of State and 
managed by the Department of Defense, will be applied toward the purchase of 
communications equipment (Beckwith).  IMET funding for FY 2002 will be used to 
provide English language training for designated officers, as well as to fund attendance at 
the following military courses: Air Command and Staff, Army Command and General 
Staff, Army Infantry Officer Basic Course, Army Military Police Basic Course, Army 
Ranger Course, Army Special Forces Qualification Course, Army Airborne Course, 
International Defense Management Course, and the Combat Strategic Intelligence 
Training Program (Beckwith).  NADR funds, which were requested and authorized but 
not spent prior to the ERF (resulting in a zero in the estimate block in Figure 4) were 
intended to be applied toward improving export controls and border security through a 
combination of equipment and training (U.S. Department of State, 2002).  The final 
category of assistance provided to Uzbekistan in FY 2002, PC, supports Peace Corps 
projects in Uzbekistan.  The Peace Corps focuses in three areas in Uzbekistan: English 
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Education and Resource Development, targeted toward integrating Uzbekistan into the 
world market economy; Business Education and Development, which provides Western 
business training; and Health, which provides assistance to rural clinics (Peace Corps, 
2002). 
B. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ENGAGEMENT 
In addition to the money and guidance that the Department of State provides, the 
Department of Defense serves as an important contributor to our relationship with 
Uzbekistan.  Department of Defense engagement is the most significant source of direct 
government-to-government contact.  However, accounting for these engagement 
activities is difficult for two reasons.  First, Department of Defense activity in Uzbekistan 
falls within the purview of the Department’s primary mission, and money spent is thereby 
counted as operational expenses, not foreign assistance.  Yet, the ancillary effects of 
military engagement could very well be the most effective form of foreign assistance that 
we provide to Uzbekistan.  Second, for security reasons, specific information on 
engagement activities remains classified, making it difficult to construct a complete 
picture of Department of Defense engagement in an unclassified format.  For these 
reasons, my discussion about Department of Defense engagement in Uzbekistan will not 
be specific.   
One exception to the “Department of Defense does not provide foreign 
assistance” rule is the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.  Budget authority is 
provided to the Department of Defense in the annual budget of the U.S. under the title 
“Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction.”  This allows the Department of Defense to 
provide assistance, through direct engagement, contracts, or grants, to dismantle WMD 
and prevent the proliferation of WMD technology and expertise (Budget of the United 
States Government, FY 2003: Appendix, 2002, p. 276).  Although I do not have specific 
dollar amounts provided to Uzbekistan under this budget authority, the program is 
specifically aimed at mitigating a known threat to the U.S. and would be desirable 
regardless of our other policy goals in Uzbekistan.  This assistance is also coordinated 
with other U.S. government agencies that utilize Department of State-controlled funds to 
achieve similar objectives (Joint Security Cooperation Consultation – JSCC, 2002). 
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The remainder of the military engagement in Uzbekistan falls under the control of 
the Commander of U.S. Central Command.  The U.S. actively supports Uzbekistan’s 
participation in the NATO Partnership for Peace Program by conducting combined 
peacekeeping training and participating in peacekeeping exercises.  The U.S. also 
conducts combined training between U.S. and Uzbekistani special operations forces.  In 
addition, the Louisiana Army National Guard has a partnership relationship with 
Uzbekistan that serves as a good example of civil-military relations and has become 
important to Uzbekistan (JSCC, 2002).  As an indication of the size and expanding nature 
of our military relationship with Uzbekistan, Major General Hagenbeck, the 10th 
Mountain Division Commander, noted that, prior to the “War on Terror,” the number of 
military contacts between the U.S. and Uzbekistan was scheduled to increase from 33 
contacts in FY 2001 to 55 in FY 2002 (JSCC, 2002).  It must be kept in mind that a 
military contact could be any in a broad range of activities, such as: IMET participation, 
planning conferences, a one-person subject matter expert exchange, or a full-blown 
exercise.  Overall, military engagement in Uzbekistan has been extremely important to 
the U.S. in securing national interests and is eagerly sought by Uzbekistan. 
There is one unique aspect to Department of Defense engagement in Uzbekistan 
worth highlighting.  As I have mentioned previously, U.S. policy makes substantial aid to 
Uzbekistan contingent upon meaningful reform.  This has limited the size, scope, and 
effectiveness of Department of State-funded assistance.  Unlike the State Department, the 
Department of Defense has been able to continuously build upon, and improve its 
engagement activities in Uzbekistan.  This is possible given the direct correlation 
between the Department of Defense engagement activities in Uzbekistan and the extent to 
which this improves the readiness of U.S. soldiers and improves the security posture of 
the U.S.  And though, from a Department of Defense perspective, any training benefit 
that the Uzbekistani military receives from engagement with the U.S. military is largely 
incidental, the incidental benefits are significant.  By working with the Uzbekistani 
military, the U.S. is able to demonstrate the behavior of a professional military and the 
functioning of democratic principles.  This provides a model for Uzbekistan to emulate; it 
inspires change instead of demanding change, and does so while the U.S. military is 
primarily focused on securing its vital and strategic national interests.   
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Given the fact that Uzbekistan has compulsory military service, the effects of a 
professional military rooted in democratic principles could eventually permeate all 
sectors of society.  This inside-out approach – the converse of the Department of State 
approach – has certainly proven effective thus far.  As Assistant Secretary of State for 
European and Eurasian Affairs, Beth Jones, acknowledges, the strength of the military-to-
military bond with Uzbekistan makes other aspects of diplomacy easier: 
there is a lot of talk about how because we have new military relationships 
with several of these governments [Uzbekistan is one] that somehow 
we’re giving a bye to human rights and democracy.  In fact, the opposite is 
the case, and we are finding it easier.  Because we have so much more 
contact, we have an easier time of discussing each of these issues with the 
governments of the region, particularly Uzbekistan.  (Jones, 2002).  
C. POST-SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 ASSISTANCE 
 As a result of the September 11, 2001 attacks and the subsequent “War on 
Terror,” the United States has dramatically increased assistance to Uzbekistan.  The 
results are highlighted in Figure 4, under ERF.  Uzbekistan has received an $83.5 million 
supplement (and may be even more since the numbers cited are only estimates).  
Additionally, the U.S. and Uzbekistan have entered into a broad political and strategic 
partnership agreement.  The agreement recognizes that both countries will actively 
cooperate in military security matters and security from the perspective that democracy 
and a free-market economy increase stability.  The categories of cooperation are: political 
relations, including democratic and economic transformation; security cooperation, which 
includes a pledge of U.S. support against external threats to Uzbekistan and improved 
military-to-military contacts; economic relations, which includes structural reform 
support; humanitarian cooperation, which involves education, health, and environmental 
issues; and legal cooperation, which includes the establishment of a rule-of-law state, 
judicial reform, an improved legislative process, and increased public awareness (“United 
States-Uzbekistan Declaration on the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework,” 
2002). 
 This increase in assistance and the cooperative agreement radically change the 
relationship between the U.S. and Uzbekistan.  In order to fulfill the pledge of 
cooperation, the U.S. is going to have to change its policy of making meaningful 
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assistance contingent upon measurable reform and become a partner in the process.  The 
question then becomes how do we effectively and efficiently accomplish this?  
D. CONCLUSION 
As the preceding discussion indicates, the U.S. is already committed to assisting 
Uzbekistan.  Committing resources and personnel automatically sends a signal of resolve. 
But there are two different perspectives when it comes to evaluating that resolve.  From 
the U.S. perspective, the message sent, and what we assume has been received, is that we 
are committed to assisting Uzbekistan, and will send more support once measurable 
action toward democratic and market reform has been taken.  However, from the 
Uzbekistani perspective, the message received is that the U.S. does not have enough 
resolve to support the difficult reformation process.  Unfortunately, both points of view, 
though seemingly incompatible, are likely to persist without a change in the way business 
is done.     
Without question, the various forms of assistance the U.S. provides to Uzbekistan 
are all noble; there are no “bad” assistance programs in Uzbekistan.  Each of the various 
assistance programs fills a necessary void at the micro-level.  However, with the 
exception of programs directed toward mitigating the WMD threat, none is expressly 
designed or directly linked to securing vital or strategic U.S. interests.  The Department 
of State-funded programs focus on creating the impetus for reform from outside the 
government, and these programs operate independently from others.  Meanwhile, the 
primary reason for conducting Department of Defense engagement in Uzbekistan is to 
improve the readiness of U.S. forces.  There is no overall concept for reforming the 
military in Uzbekistan, just some well-designed engagement activities that happen to 
have high ancillary effects.  Although the security-oriented assistance provided to 
Uzbekistan using FSA and NADR funding could, arguably, be linked to securing U.S. 
interests while also assisting the government of Uzbekistan secure its vital, strategic, and 
important interests, the programs are piecemeal, failing to address the larger structural 
issues.  Taken together, what they amount to is sticking a finger in the leaking hole of a 
disintegrating levy.  I would argue that even these programs fail to secure our national 
interests.  Unity of effort and economy of resources are not phrases that could be used to 
accurately describe U.S. assistance to Uzbekistan. 
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However, it would not take much to fix this.  While not expressly designed to 
counter an insurgency, each of the assistance programs currently budgeted could be 
neatly plugged into the counterinsurgency “mystic diamond” from Figure 3 
(Counterinsurgency Options) in Chapter III.  The USAID, humanitarian, and Peace Corps 
programs address “Option A” - the hearts and minds approach.  The security-oriented and 
law enforcement assistance programs address “Options B and D” – cutting off insurgent 
links with the populace and interdicting outside support.  And the military engagement 
activity indirectly supports “Option C” – targeting insurgents with military force.  By 
thinking about these programs in these terms, our assistance could be made to seem far 
more useful for counterinsurgency in Uzbekistan than is currently the case and would 
gain an internal consistency and coherence that would also assist us while addressing the 
Uzbekistani government’s number one concern.  At the moment, engagement between 
the U.S. and higher-level Uzbekistani government officials regarding the structural 
reforms necessary to implement an effective counterinsurgency program is notably 
lacking.  At the same time, the outside-in approach to reform that the State Department 
has adopted only increases the friction between the government and populace, which in 
and of itself does not help stimulate reform in the face of an insurgency.  Additionally, 
there is really no evidence to suggest that our assistance programs target areas that the 
Uzbekistani government considers high priority.     
To summarize my argument thus far: the U.S. has significant interests in 
Uzbekistan, the threat of insurgency is preventing the government of Uzbekistan from 
taking steps toward necessary reform, and current U.S. assistance is not as effectively 
applied as it could – or arguably should – be.  The remainder of the thesis will address 
what the U.S. should do to assist in stabilizing Uzbekistan and protecting U.S. interests.   
51 
V. A FRAMEWORK OF U.S. ASSISTANCE 
Ironically, the United States does have a framework for integrating the oversight 
and execution of foreign assistance to countries facing developmental challenges.  Joint 
Publication 3-07.1: Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal 
Defense contains this framework.  The terminology is a bit confusing and must be 
clarified a bit.  The term Foreign Internal Defense, or FID, is defined as: 
Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of 
the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its 
society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. (Joint Pub 1-02, 
2001, p. 174). 
By this definition, all of the various U.S. programs in Uzbekistan could qualify as FID.  
However, Joint Pub 3-07.1 unifies the various aspects of FID within an organizational 
structure characterized by unity of effort, unity of command, and clarity of purpose.  
Therefore, the definition of FID ranges from the minimalist definition of Joint Pub 1-02, 
where a single action by a single agency to assist a nation constitutes FID, to the concept 
embodied in Joint Pub 3-07.1, where individual actions by separate agencies are an 
integral part of the overall U.S. FID effort.  For the purpose of this thesis the latter 
definition is of primary concern.  It is worthwhile examining this concept of FID as it 
effectively and efficiently organizes U.S. assistance and appears to be the perfect model 
for conducting engagement with Uzbekistan.   
A. INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT 
If FID is the overall framework for the organization of the U.S. effort in a foreign 
country, Internal Defense and Development, or IDAD, is the strategy on which the 
framework depends.  IDAD is defined as: 
The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to 
protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.  It focuses on 
building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that 
respond to the needs of society.  (Joint Pub 1-02, p. 221) 
It is important to note that the IDAD strategy is that of the host nation and U.S. support is 
designed to supplement host nation efforts.  In the perfect scenario (i.e. there is no threat 
to the established regime), the IDAD strategy exists to preempt insurgency and violence.  
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If an insurgency or other threat develops, the IDAD strategy becomes an active strategy 
to mitigate the threat.  The strategy is carried out by adhering to four interdependent 
functions: balanced development, security, neutralization, and mobilization (Joint Pub 3-
07.1, p. C1).   
1. Four Interdependent Functions of IDAD 
a. Balanced Development   
Balanced development consists of the political, economic, and social 
programs that a responsible government designs and enacts to look out for its citizens.  
These programs equally favor all individuals and groups within a society in order to deny 
the opposition or insurgents the ability to build up popular support because of a legitimate 
grievance.  Properly identifying and taking steps to correct potential socially destabilizing 
conditions is a critical aspect of balanced development (Joint Pub 3-07.1, p. C-1).  
Referring back to Figure 3 (Counterinsurgency Options) in Chapter III, balanced 
development is characteristic of Option “A” (the hearts and minds approach).   
b. Security   
The meaning of security in relation to IDAD is twofold.  It consists of the 
security of government resources and security of the population.  This type of security is 
necessary to protect the population from the threat of the insurgents and also to provide a 
secure environment for the development of the country.  The ideal environment is one in 
which the people are able to provide for the majority of their security with limited 
government support.  However, it is equally important to deny the enemy access to 
popular support that may include some population control measures (Joint Pub 3-07.1, 
pp. C1-C2).  Security is most characteristic of Option “B” (interdicting the ability of the 
insurgents to connect with the populace) from Figure 3 (Counterinsurgency Options) in 
Chapter III.   
c. Neutralization   
Neutralization consists of a wide variety of actions designed to minimize 
the threat that the insurgent force poses to the government and the population.  The range 
of actions could be from discrediting the insurgent movement or its leaders through 
information campaigns, arrest of members for breaking the law, up to large-scale combat 
actions to destroy the insurgent force.  It is critical that all neutralization efforts adhere to 
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the country’s legal system and observe individual rights.  By acting lawfully, the security 
forces enhance the legitimacy of the government, deny the enemy an exploitable issue, 
and enjoy the international credibility of a humanitarian oriented force (Joint Pub 3-07.1, 
pp. C-2 – C-3).  Neutralization characterizes Options “B, C, and D” from Figure 3 
(Counterinsurgency Options) in Chapter III (Option “C” is targeting the insurgent group 
directly and Option “D” is interdicting the ability of the insurgents to receive outside 
support).   
 d. Mobilization   
Mobilization refers to enlisting the manpower and materiel support from 
as large a segment of the population as possible.  In maximizing the manpower and 
materiel available to the government, the amount of support available to the insurgents is 
minimized.  Together with the other interrelated functions, mobilization provides the 
means necessary to enact programs that respond to the needs of the populace.  With a 
type of citizenry-government cooperative agreement, the counterinsurgency effort is able 
to encompass a much larger area (Joint Pub 3-07.1, p. C-3).  Mobilization primarily 
characterizes Options “A and B” from Figure 3 (Counterinsurgency Options) in Chapter 
III, although all of the options would be impacted through the application of this function. 
These four interdependent functions form the backbone of the host nation’s IDAD 
program.  The goal is the development of these functions by “building viable political, 
economic, military, and social institutions that respond to the needs of society” (Joint Pub 
3-07.1, p. C-1).  In order to accomplish this goal, it is necessary to adhere to four 
principles in each of the interdependent functions.  The four principles are: unity of 
effort, maximum use of intelligence, minimum use of violence, and a responsive 
government. 
2. Four Principles of IDAD 
a. Unity of Effort   
This principle is necessary to most effectively use limited resources and to 
ensure synchronization between the various elements of national power and the four 
interdependent functions of IDAD.  This principle implies some organizational design, 
which will be discussed later, but the overall concept is coordinated action and 
centralized control at all levels (Joint Pub 3-07.1, p. C-3). 
54 
b. Maximum Use of Intelligence   
All operations must be based upon timely and accurate intelligence from 
reliable sources whether the operation is military, political, economic, or informational in 
nature.  In addition, strict attention must be paid to counterintelligence so that the 
insurgents do not have time to devise a counter-plan or move their forces from the area 
(Joint Pub 3-07.1, p. C-3).   
c. Minimum Use of Violence   
Discrete use of force is the guideline for counterinsurgency operations; 
however, at times, the best means to minimize violence may be the overwhelming use of 
force.  Nevertheless, excessive violence by the military or security forces of a country, 
while expedient and effective in the short term, degrades the legitimacy of the 
government and will not build popular support (Joint Pub 3-07.1, p. C-3).   
d. A Responsive Government   
The most enduring method of gaining popular support is to demonstrate 
that the government is operating in accordance with the needs of its citizens.  This 
increases the ease with which the government mobilizes the population and resources 
while demonstrating competence in the realm of administration, management, and 
leadership (Joint Pub 3-07.1, p. C-3).    
3. Organizational Concept for IDAD 
The IDAD strategy, as contained in Joint Pub 3-07-1, provides a basic concept for 
the organizational design of the host nation’s IDAD program.  Although the 
organizational configuration may vary greatly depending on the country, the overall 
concept includes a national level organization with sub-national branches.  The 
organization should strive for centralized direction and de-centralized execution of the 
various programs.  The generic structure for the counterinsurgency planning and 
coordination organization is depicted below in Figure 5 (Generic Counterinsurgency 
Planning and Coordination Organization). 
The chief executive of the country, the President in the case of Uzbekistan, is in 
overall charge of the organization.  The director and the staff of the planning and 
administration offices are independent members of the organization, while members of 
corresponding branches or agencies of the national government staff the rest of the 
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offices.  As mentioned, the national level organization’s primary purpose is to provide 
centralized direction of the counterinsurgency effort.  However, the appropriate agencies 
or branches of government are represented in the organization in order to coordinate and 
direct the IDAD effort of their particular government agency.  The national level 
 
Figure 5.   Generic Counterinsurgency Planning and Coordination Organization (From: Joint 
Pub 3-07.1, p. C-4) 
 
organization prepares the national IDAD plan and coordinates programs.  The director 
oversees this process and gains the chief executive’s decisions concerning the delineation 
of authority, establishment of responsibility, designation of objectives, and allocation of 
resources (Joint Pub 3-07.1, pp. C-4 – C-5). 
The sub-national organizations are created along the lines of existing political 
organizations, i.e. provinces, districts, or states, or may be created for particular urban 
areas if the need dictates.  Dubbed Area Coordination Centers (ACC), it is the 
responsibility of these organizations to serve as the civil-military headquarters at their 
level of organization.  In such a capacity, the ACC plans, coordinates, and executes 
programs and operations in support of the IDAD program.  The ACC should have direct 
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control over the military and government agencies within its jurisdiction while not 
replacing the current government administrative apparatus.  Staffed by a senior 
government official, the ACC is suitably organized to tailor the IDAD programs to the 
particular needs of the area of operations.  The organization will vary depending on 
location, but the ACC should, similar to the national organization, be staffed by members 
of the government with experience in the government agencies taking part in the IDAD 
effort (Joint Pub 3-07.1, pp. C-5 – C-6). 
The final organizational structure for IDAD is the civilian advisory committees.  
These committees are comprised of influential citizens embedded within the national and 
sub-national coordination centers.  The civilian advisory committees provide a critical 
link between the population and the government and, when used properly, will increase 
the local populace’s stake in, and commitment to, government programs.  The civilian 
advisory committees should fairly represent all of the population, including minorities.  
Good examples of influential civilians to serve on the civilian advisory committees and 
act as key communicators are: clergy, educators, labor officials, health care professionals, 
local media personalities, and business leaders (Joint Pub 3-07.1, p. C-6).   
B. U.S. FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE 
IDAD boils down to the host nation’s strategy for preventing or solving 
insurgency unilaterally.  The framework of FID supplements the host nation’s IDAD 
efforts with U.S. advice and assistance.  An effective FID program incorporates all U.S. 
elements of national power – diplomatic, economic, informational, military – in concert 
with the host nation IDAD program in order to foster internal solutions to the supported 
nation’s problems.  By focusing on internal development, the usefulness of the FID 
program is exponentially enhanced by addressing areas beyond strict counterinsurgency 
(Joint Pub 3-07.1, p. I-3).  Since the most significant manifestations of the supported 
country’s problems are likely to occur in the economic, social, informational, or political 
arenas, the principle focus of U.S. efforts should be the programs that address these needs 
by building or bolstering viable institutions that respond to the needs of the people (Joint 




1. Applying the Elements of National Power 
As with the four interdependent functions of IDAD, within the FID framework 
the elements of national power must be applied in coordination with each other to ensure 
a complementary relationship.  It may be determined by national policy that certain 
elements of national power should be emphasized over others, yet the necessity for 
coordinating the response of the various elements does not disappear in order to send a 
consistent signal of U.S. resolve.  A brief examination of the elements of national power 
illustrates their complementary and all-encompassing nature. 
a. Diplomatic Element   
Diplomacy is often the first element of national power emphasized in U.S. 
foreign policy (Joint Pub 3-07.1, p. I-3).  The range of the diplomatic response is wide – 
from recognition and promises of assistance to the severing of diplomatic ties.  However, 
in the case of a country that is a potential candidate for U.S. FID, the diplomatic element 
sets the stage for U.S. engagement with the country.  The diplomatic element effectively 
bridges the gap between U.S. interests and the assistance that the U.S. will provide to a 
given country.  The goal of exercising the U.S. diplomatic element of national power is to 
create a functional political system in the target country that can effectively and 
responsibly manage the elements of national power within that country.  The proper 
signaling of U.S. commitment and resolve is a critical aspect of the diplomatic element. 
b. Economic Element   
It is a fair generalization to make that economic problems pervade all 
aspects of a country’s internal strife.  Poor economic conditions may not be the root cause 
of all societal ills.  However, such conditions foster an environment in which lawlessness, 
subversion, and insurgency can gain a foothold and expand.  The economic element of 
U.S. national power can be applied in various ways, including, direct financial assistance, 
favorable trade arrangements, assistance in establishing macro and micro-economic 
systems, agricultural or industrial assistance, and security assistance, to name a few (Joint 




c. Informational Element   
The informational element of national power is critical to an effective FID 
program in order to keep the public informed of the positive steps the government is 
taking and to let people know how they can benefit.  Just as important is effectively 
countering the propaganda professed by the insurgents.  The informational element of 
national power comprises the disciplines of public diplomacy, public affairs, and 
psychological operations (Joint Pub 3-07.1, p. I-3 – I-4).  Without proper application of 
this element of national power the overall effectiveness of the FID program cannot be 
maximized.   
d. Military Element   
The military element of national power plays an important supporting role 
in the overall FID effort.  One aspect is psychological due to the fact that the commitment 
of U.S. troops to a FID effort signals resolve disproportionate to the commitment.  
Another aspect is practical in that U.S. military officials may “have greater access to and 
credibility with HN (host nation) regimes that are heavily influenced or dominated by 
their own military” (Joint Pub 3-07.1, p. I-4).  The military elements within a country are 
critical to the security of the country and are entrusted with creating a stable environment 
that is necessary for further development.  Therefore, engaging the military element is the 
first step in securing the precondition of stability that is necessary for success of the 
overall FID effort.  Furthermore, in countries with compulsory military service, the 
effects of professionalizing the military will reach nearly every segment of the society.    
2. FID Tools 
The tools, or methods, available to the U.S. government in supporting a FID effort 
are limited only by imagination and organizational skills.  The critical component of any 
of the tools employed is the direct linkage to the purpose of the FID effort and integration 
with other tools and elements of national power.  For example, a military civic action 
program designed to improve irrigation in a particularly underdeveloped but populated 
area can easily be synchronized with all of the elements of national power and integrated 
with the host nation’s IDAD plan.  Military civic action (MCA) consists mainly of U.S. 
troops advising or supervising indigenous military forces in construction projects, support 
missions, and services that benefit the local populace (Joint Pub 3-07.1, p. I-13).  
59 
Walking through this hypothetical scenario, which coincidentally could be useful and 
executable in Uzbekistan with the assets and programs currently in place, illustrates how 
the various tools available can be integrated to exponentially increase the effects of a 
relatively small MCA project. 
In the FID framework, the host nation identifies the population in the area as 
vulnerable to insurgents and economically underdeveloped through its IDAD 
organization.  The U.S. FID organization offers the assistance of an MCA program to 
improve something like say, irrigation in the area.  The diplomatic element of power is 
exercised in this case by committing U.S. troops to a host nation program, thereby 
strengthening resolve by assigning a valuable U.S. resource to a local, host nation issue.  
Getting local leaders involved in the project and creating linkages with the national 
government can further enhance the diplomatic element by demonstrating and exercising 
a responsive government.  The economic element can build off of the effects of the MCA 
project by developing the agricultural knowledge of local farmers so that they can 
maximize the benefits that improved irrigation brings.  Additionally, economic programs 
can provide assistance to improve or create entrepreneurial businesses that support and 
benefit from improved irrigation and more effective farming.  The informational element 
can likewise benefit if integrated with the MCA project.  Public affairs can heighten 
awareness and interest in the program.  Getting local media involved will also provide an 
opportunity to develop their skills and integrate them into the national IDAD plan as it 
relates to the informational element of national power.  Public diplomacy can emphasize 
that the government is taking action in support of the people and that the host nation 
military is compassionately providing a beneficial service.  Psychological operations can 
be employed to mitigate the effects of insurgent propaganda while more specifically 
addressing the needs and concerns of the local populace.  The military serves as the 
catalyst for this synergistic effort.  The military element of national power is 
disproportionately small compared to the potential benefits. 
As this scenario illustrates, the tools available to each of the separate elements of 
national power are tailored to the specific situation.  Joint Pub 3-07.1 provides examples 
of tools available to the military element of national power, separating them into 
theoretical categories of U.S. support.  The categories are: indirect support, direct support 
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(not involving combat operations), and combat operations (pp. I-5 – I-14).  The 
categories are not exclusive and may all operate simultaneously; they merely organize the 
tools according to the level of U.S. commitment and acceptable risk (pp. I-4 – I-5).  
Regardless of the categorization process, the coordination and integration of the various 
elements of national power and the host nation IDAD program does not instinctively 
occur.  This requires a well-led organization, focused on a common goal, and an 
appreciation for lateral coordination.    
3. FID Organization 
Due to the fact that every FID effort is different in size, scope, goals, and 
environment there is no prescribed organization for overseeing a U.S. FID effort.  A 
small effort (or, indirect support in Department of Defense terminology) may not require 
a supervisory organization in addition to what already exists, while a larger effort could 
quickly exceed the management capabilities of in-place organizations (Joint Pub 3-07.1, 
p. II-3).  When the decision is made to support a foreign government through FID it is 
critical to analyze the goals of the effort, assets and resources available, host nation 
mechanisms, and environmental factors to create an organizational structure that can 
effectively manage the diverse assets committed to the FID effort, make the assets 
“usable” to the host nation, integrate the various elements of national power, and 
maximize the effectiveness of the assistance provided.  This is no easy task.  Although 
there is no template for designing a FID organization, there are some principles to follow 
and in-place organizations from which to learn.  For the purposes of this discussion I am 
going to assume that the FID effort requires an organization in excess of what the U.S. 
Country Team and the geographic Combatant Commander can provide.   
The first principle to bear in mind is one of leadership.  The Department of State 
is generally the lead agency for FID (Joint Pub 3-07.1, p. II-3) and the Ambassador of the 
country has complete authority over all official U.S. government activities within the 
country (Joint Pub 3-07.1, p. II-12).  Furthermore, the Country Team possesses in-depth 
knowledge about the situation in the host nation that will impact on the FID effort.  
Having said that, a robust FID effort requires a visionary leader who understands the 
problem, is knowledgeable about the assets available, can easily communicate with the 
host nation IDAD organization, and can effectively communicate with, coordinate, and 
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task the variety of U.S. government agencies involved.  This is a full-time job and most 
likely exceeds the time that the Ambassador, or any member of the Country Team, has 
available.  Nevertheless, the head of the FID organization should be directly accountable 
to the Ambassador, with the Secretary of State and President completing the chain of 
command.  This ensures a direct link between U.S. policy and execution of the FID effort 
and removes agency parochialism as a potential source of conflict or narrow-mindedness 
within the organization.   
Another principle critical in the design of a FID organization is integration of 
multiple government agencies.  Integration is far more complex than coordination.  
Ideally, the agencies – representing the elements of national power – are all incorporated 
into the organization in a seamless manner to create a synergy that benefits the host 
nation and supports U.S. interests in the most efficient manner (Joint Pub 3-07.1, p. II-1).  
This implies that the representatives of the various agencies have to interact on a peer 
basis, working for the benefit of the FID organization.  As illustrated in my hypothetical 
example of the MCA project, each agency adds value, sometimes more value than the 
“main effort” or “lead agency.”  This presents a complex organizational design problem 
for our traditionally bureaucratic government.  Keeping the management organization 
small, with a knowledgeable core of agency representatives, seems like the most effective 
way to overcome this obstacle. 
Coordination is a third critical principle.  The representatives within the FID 
organization will be required to coordinate the support of their agency along traditional 
lines of organization, while the FID organization itself will need to be able to effectively 
coordinate with the IDAD organization within the host nation.  Additionally, depending 
on the situation, the FID organization may have to coordinate with other nations 
providing assistance to avoid a duplication of effort and to maximize the benefits of U.S. 
assistance (Joint Pub 3-07.1, p. II-1).   The requirement for effective coordination will 
most likely increase the size and structure of the FID organization.   
Examples of effective organizations also provide some insight when designing a 
FID organization.  The most easily adapted organization is that of the U.S. Country Team 
in the host nation to be supported.  Figure 6 (Country Team Concept), below, provides a 
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generic concept for the organizational design of U.S. government agencies working in a 
foreign country.  The Ambassador, as mentioned previously, has complete authority over 
all official U.S. government activity within the country.  The remainder of the Country 
Team includes State Department and other government agency personnel organized into 
functional roles.  The representatives in a Country Team vary depending upon location 
but accurately represent the U.S. government activities (i.e. engagement) within the 
country.  In designing a FID organization, the agencies and functional areas represented 
on the Country Team serve as a model for what agencies need to have representation.  
Ideally, the expertise and experience of members of the Country Team are fully utilized.  
Depending upon the situation, workload, and other factors, it may be advantageous to 
have members of the Country Team also filling roles in the FID organization.   
Ambassador























Figure 6.   Country Team Concept (After: Joint Pub 3-07.1, p. II-11) 
 
Another organization to consider in developing a FID organization is the joint 
staff of the Combatant Commander.  Although the organization of the joint staff is 
focused on military matters, it is designed to handle the planning, execution, and support 
of a myriad of tasks – from humanitarian assistance to combat operations – 
simultaneously.  Although it is unlikely, and undesirable, that the FID organization 
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should achieve anywhere near the size of the joint staff, the integration and coordination 
mechanisms that the joint staff has implemented to unify the array of interests within the 
military could be useful to the FID organization.     
C. CONCLUSION 
The framework provided in Joint Pub 3-07.1 is infinitely useful in organizing the 
various forms of assistance that the U.S. provides to countries facing internal 
development threats.  The synergy created by unifying the full array of assistance tools 
within a single organization that is focused on a single goal in support of U.S. interests is 
invaluable.  The framework capitalizes on the inherent “goodness” of each of the 
assistance tools or programs but is able to magnify the effects through integration.  By 
working in concert with the host nation government and its IDAD program, the 
framework also develops the concept of a responsive government and assists with the 
difficult development process.  Although the FID organization’s focus is on a single goal 
– to maximize the effectiveness of assistance, which should be counterinsurgency in the 
case of Uzbekistan – the process of implementing and executing the FID framework 
achieves precisely what the last three administrations have been striving for in 
Uzbekistan: democratic and market reform along with honoring the value of human 
rights.  The FID framework presented in Joint Pub 3-07.1 is an active doctrinal concept 
within the U.S. government that may have been too often overlooked in the difficult 
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VI. ADAPTED FID IN UZBEKISTAN 
 Given the fact that the U.S. has enduring interests in Uzbekistan, and that 
attainment of those interests is precariously dependent upon a number of variables 
internal and external to Uzbekistan, the proposition that U.S. assistance to Uzbekistan 
should be more effectively and efficiently administered is commonsensical.  Furthermore, 
if only we paid attention to the rhetoric of the government of Uzbekistan and the 
dynamics of insurgency theory, it is only logical that the focus of U.S. support would be 
reoriented towards counterinsurgency.  As I stated in Chapter III, the strength and 
capability of the IMU or any other insurgent force is less relevant than the fact that the 
perceived threat results in some very real actions on the part of the government, and those 
actions stand in the way of democratic and market reform along with the ability of the 
U.S. to secure national interests.  Without getting bogged down in a discussion of 
leadership theory, my experience is that it is much easier and more effective if you can 
inspire appropriate behavior and actions versus demand them.  I believe this point 
accurately applies to Uzbekistan as the U.S. seeks democratic and market reform.  
However, as I also pointed out in Chapter III, the likelihood of Uzbekistan enacting 
significant reform in the face of an insurgent threat is small.  From the government’s 
perspective, attempting unilateral reform would be a suicidal move, and this feeling is 
partially justified by insurgency theory.     
The government of Uzbekistan needs some security guarantees in the form of a 
dependable partner, whether those guarantees come from Russia, China, or the U.S. 
remains to be seen.  Obviously, my feeling is that it is incumbent on the U.S. to provide 
those guarantees.  Thankfully, the FID framework, presented in Joint Pub 3-07.1, 
provides the U.S. with the ability to effectively and efficiently address the concerns of 
Uzbekistan while truly promoting the development of a more democratic and free-market 
oriented society, all this while definitively securing U.S. national interests. 
 I will broadly outline a concept for FID engagement with Uzbekistan, 
incorporating some tactics that may be useful.  I must preface this discussion by 
admitting that I am extremely unqualified to attempt such an endeavor.  I am a soldier 
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and cannot pretend to possess the political acumen of a professional diplomat, the 
financial knowledge of an economist, the cultural understanding of an anthropologist, or 
the agronomic skills of a rural development specialist.  However, the strength of the FID 
framework lies in the fact that no single discipline predominates; they are all equally 
important.  The key is to accurately apply each of the disciplines to address a single 
problem, which in the case of Uzbekistan is counterinsurgency – and that is a soldier’s 
bailiwick.  Understanding insurgency theory has to be considered critical to the 
effectiveness of the FID program, lending at least some legitimacy to this proposal.   
A. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Without question, the proposal for the U.S. to support Uzbekistan through the FID 
framework of Joint Pub 3-07.1 requires a shift in policy.  Primarily the U.S. would have 
to shift from a policy of making assistance contingent upon measurable democratic and 
market reform, to a policy of becoming a partner in the reform process.  In doing so, the 
U.S. could be criticized by any number of groups or even other countries for supporting a 
repressive government.  However, through public diplomacy, the positive aspect of this 
criticism could be emphasized.  By highlighting the benevolent aspect of our engagement 
and demonstrating progress, the U.S. could as easily gain international approval while 
securing national interests at the same time. 
However, shifting policy toward becoming a partner in the reform process may 
not be that radical a shift.  Since the “War on Terror,” the U.S. has become increasingly 
engaged with Uzbekistan.  Indeed, the signing of the “ United States – Uzbekistan 
Declaration on the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework” nearly completes 
the process.  Excerpts from the press release state: 
Uzbekistan reaffirms its commitment to further intensify the democratic 
transformation of its society politically and economically.  The United 
States agrees to provide the Government of Uzbekistan assistance in 
implementing democratic reforms … The U.S. affirms that it would regard 
with grave concern any external threat to the security and territorial 
integrity of the Republic of Uzbekistan … Both countries recognize the 
need to build in Uzbekistan a rule-of-law state and democratic society.  
(2002) 
Given these statements, there is no way to get around the fact that the U.S. has to 
significantly increase engagement with the government of Uzbekistan to fulfill this 
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pledge.  The question is how.  Once again, I submit that the FID framework is the only 
solution.   
Applying the FID framework in Uzbekistan is not without cost.  A management 
organization would have to be established because the U.S. Country Team in Uzbekistan 
is currently understaffed without the additional burden of focusing on an intensive FID 
effort.  The primary costs would be in manpower and office space.  Additionally, there 
would undoubtedly be an increased need for foreign assistance to support the various FID 
projects.  It appears from the “Declaration on the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation 
Framework” that the U.S. is prepared to increase support to Uzbekistan anyway.  One 
benefit of the FID framework is that it allows for operating with an economy of scale 
approach: the effectiveness of each of the elements of national power is enhanced 
through integration with the other elements.  When properly managed, the cost of 
implementing programs would drop – thanks to shared resources – and the effectiveness 
of each individual program would increase.  The FID framework can thus provide 
superior results at a lower cost.  As a taxpayer, that makes me happy.   
B. IDAD 
One large hurdle to implementing the FID framework in Uzbekistan is IDAD.  
Going back to Chapter V, U.S. FID supplements the host nation IDAD program.  Without 
this relationship, the only difference between my proposal and our current assistance 
programs is increased government-to-government contact and improved U.S. agency 
integration.  Additionally, without the close government-to-government contact that the 
IDAD-FID framework requires, the short-term effects of targeted, efficient assistance 
programs are diluted, and the long-term benefits of promoting more accountable and 
responsive governance are jeopardized.  Therefore, attaining this relationship is critical to 
the overall success of the effort.   
It could be reasonably argued that within the current political atmosphere of 
Uzbekistan, the establishment of an effective IDAD organization is unrealistic.  The 
power within the government of Uzbekistan does reside with the president and it would 
not be difficult to present evidence to support the notion that persons within the 
government kowtow to the president’s desires.  However, in understanding the political 
environment, the U.S. could use these legitimate criticisms as a catalyst for the 
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establishment of an effective IDAD organization.  Two examples in particular highlight 
this opportunity. 
First, President Karimov has, very publicly, put his reputation at stake in support 
of reform.  His book, Uzbekistan on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century, 
published in English in 1998, outlines the numerous challenges that Uzbekistan faces to 
become a stable, prosperous, integral member of the international community.  Karimov, 
in detail, highlights the necessity for and vision of reform in nearly every aspect of public 
and private life (Karimov, 1998).  The book should be required reading for any U.S. 
official involved in policy or engagement in Uzbekistan in order to, at a minimum, gain 
knowledge of the president’s publicly stated point of view.  However, more importantly, 
the book is structured in a way that almost perfectly lends itself to serving as the 
visionary document of an IDAD organization.  In fact, moving from the principles 
established in the book to setting up an organization charged with enacting the 
philosophy appears to be quite a natural progression.  Therefore, the U.S. could 
emphasize the publicly espoused viewpoints of the president in justification of the 
establishment of an IDAD organization.   
Second, the government of Uzbekistan recognizes the need for an integrated 
approach to address its problems.  Not surprisingly, the most significant manifestation of 
this has been within the security realm.  This is not surprising because of the 
government’s reliance on internal security to address the threat posed by insurgency (see 
Chapter III).  Nevertheless, the government of Uzbekistan has gone through several 
command and control arrangements between the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of the 
Interior, and Ministry of Emergency Situations in order to establish an effective method 
to coordinate responses and share information (JSCC).  The IDAD concept accomplishes 
this integration, only to a far greater extent than the government of Uzbekistan is 
currently doing.  Essentially, the IDAD concept sells itself when expressed in terms of 
unity of effort, efficiency, and effectiveness. 
In other words, the creation of an effective IDAD organization within the 
government of Uzbekistan appears to be entirely possible.  However, the impetus for the 
establishment of the IDAD organization must remain with the government of Uzbekistan.  
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Diplomatic “bullying” by the U.S. to create the organization would likely result in the 
creation of a powerless organization, designed merely to satisfy U.S. demands.  However, 
by fostering an understanding of the concept of FID, the U.S. government could inspire 
the Uzbekistani government to create an effective organization. 
C. FID 
The primary focus of a newly established FID effort in Uzbekistan should initially 
be on the process.  It is essential that each member of the management organization 
understand the concept and goals of FID, along with how and where their expertise 
applies.  The FID organization should be made completely aware of the interests the U.S. 
has in Uzbekistan in addition to how the tools available – in the framework of the 
elements of national power – can be applied to counter insurgent threats, while at the 
same time strengthening the legitimacy of the government of Uzbekistan.  In 
coordination with the Uzbekistani IDAD organization, the FID organization should 
identify target areas and apply resources to achieve clearly defined results, integrating as 
many of the elements of national power as possible in order to take advantage of their 
cumulative synergistic effects.   
In order to avoid a “body count” mentality, the FID organization should avoid 
using the decreasing incidence of insurgent activity as a measure of effectiveness.  
Instead, the FID organization should be focused on the internal development of 
Uzbekistani governmental and social institutions, using the pace of reform and increases 
in popular support for the government as measures of effectiveness.  Furthermore, the 
FID organization should appreciate that reform is a difficult process.  In recognizing this, 
the FID organization should have the flexibility to adjust strategy in order to overcome 
resistance.  Rather than force compliance on the part of the Uzbekistani government in 
one particular area, the FID organization should shift emphasis to other areas, with a plan 
to come back to difficult or controversial issues.  Through demonstrated partnership, the 
FID organization will increasingly gain influence, thereby becoming more successful in 
achieving U.S. goals and securing U.S. interests over the long term. 
As far as administering the various tools of U.S. assistance, there appears to be no 
significant reason to radically shift from our current assistance programs until thorough 
evaluations are conducted.  Unifying the current programs under the FID organization 
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and defining them in terms of how they assist the counterinsurgency effort achieves the 
initial benefit of unity of effort and also provides the executors of the programs with a 
clear focus for adjusting the programs, if necessary.  Some local adjustment about where 
current programs are located is most likely necessary to achieve congruence with 
Uzbekistani aims and to be able to integrate the various programs so that each builds 
upon another’s success.  There are, however, numerous ways in which the U.S. could 
enhance the FID framework to achieve desirable results.  By way of example, I will 
propose some tactics at the level of national power that could help improve engagement 
with Uzbekistan and secure U.S. interests.  These tactics are by no means comprehensive 
or infallible; they merely serve as examples of how to maximize the potential of the FID 
framework.   
1. Diplomatic 
As mentioned previously, the diplomatic element of national power sets the 
context for all U.S. activity within Uzbekistan.  Therefore, diplomatically, the U.S. 
government needs to send a clear signal of commitment to Uzbekistan.  The signing of 
the “Strategic Partnership and Cooperative Framework” is one such signal.  This needs to 
be followed up by increased government-to-government contacts.  Establishing a FID 
organization to provide focused assistance to Uzbekistan along with fostering the 
development of a counterpart Uzbekistani IDAD organization would also be powerful 
signals of commitment.  Additionally, shifting the Department of State’s outside-in 
strategy to a more holistic approach that embraces the government as well as members of 
society would create a more cooperative atmosphere between the U.S. and Uzbekistani 
governments as well as between the Uzbekistani government and its citizenry.  
Diplomatic engagement is necessary in so many areas that it becomes nearly 
impossible to enumerate them all.  The U.S. could focus diplomatic efforts at the 
national, regional, and local levels in literally every realm of government.  Of course, this 
is impractical, as well as wholly unmanageable.  Because it is widely agreed that 
Uzbekistan lacks a sufficient legal foundation on which to build a democratically rooted 
society, initial diplomatic efforts could be focused in this area first.  This creates the 
opportunity for further improvements.  For example, it is generally agreed that by 
promoting the rule of law a government also creates an environment in which a market-
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based economy can take root.  Then, diplomatic efforts should supplement the other 
elements of national power, such as assisting in the structural reforms necessary to 
achieve a market-based economy.  The overriding principle to bear in mind when 
exercising the diplomatic element of national power in Uzbekistan is that our goal is not 
to replicate our system.  Our goal should be to create the environment in which the 
Uzbekistani people have the ability to make educated and informed decisions regarding 
their government and their future.  The milieu of Uzbekistan is completely different than 
our own.  Because of this, it is predictable that their concept of democracy, given the 
chance to freely develop, will differ from ours.  The diplomatic element of national 
power should not focus on importing specific democratic institutions but should help 
create conditions under which these can develop organically.  
2. Economic 
Addressing the desperate economic conditions in Uzbekistan is integral to 
stabilizing the country, alleviating humanitarian concerns, mitigating the insurgent threat, 
and increasing support for the government.  Needless to say, strong support from the 
economic element of national power is critical to our overall success.  Economic 
assistance can take many different forms, several of which we are currently involved in to 
one degree or another.  It seems logical that the U.S., in becoming a strategic partner, 
needs to change our current practice of not providing the government of Uzbekistan with 
any direct assistance.  Appropriate direct assistance could be in the form of grants or 
funds targeted for specific use by the Uzbekistani government.  It is counterproductive to 
push for the concept of a responsive government if the government does not have the 
financial flexibility to respond.  In order to build up support for the government and 
interest in the process, the people of Uzbekistan need some tangible examples of 
responsive government in action.  The FID organization could provide the oversight 
necessary to grant the government of Uzbekistan targeted funds.  Another area the U.S. 
government needs to place an emphasis is on the mechanisms for achieving structural 
reform of the economy.   
Aside from direct government economic assistance, the programs that USAID 
administers in Uzbekistan should be evaluated and expanded upon.  Without rehashing 
the programs examined in Chapter IV, the methodology behind the USAID programs 
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seems particularly well suited to an increased FID program.  The USAID programs, in 
concert with increased governmental cooperation and other U.S. agency integration, 
could achieve dramatic results.  There is also the need for increased assistance in health 
care, agriculture, ecology, and industry.  The Peace Corps is one way the U.S. 
government could address these needs, but there is also a plethora of U.S. private and 
non-governmental organizations that would willingly assist.  Every one of these aspects 
of assistance holds profound economic implications.  The FID organization serves as an 
analytical tool to help determine the most effective and efficient means to apply these 
various tactics and then will act to coordinate them, so that the whole can be greater than 
the sum of otherwise disparate parts.   
3. Informational 
As with the economic element of national power, the U.S. has been engaged with 
the informational element of national power in Uzbekistan, primarily through USAID, 
but also by supporting Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.  Increased emphasis on the 
informational element would be extremely beneficial to FID in Uzbekistan.  Through 
public affairs, the U.S. and Uzbekistan could do more to publicize what the governments 
are doing and plan to do to support the people of Uzbekistan.  I have already mentioned 
that integrating publicity campaigns with assistance programs results in a synergy that is 
otherwise unobtainable.  Additionally, through increasing engagement with independent 
media and helping the media develop a professional journalistic ethic, the U.S. could 
assist in defusing the tension between the government and independent media.  One 
aspect of public diplomacy that would be particularly useful in Uzbekistan is a “town-hall 
meeting” approach, whereby influential members of the government could hear and 
respond to the concerns of the people.  Then, the IDAD-FID organization could quickly 
take those concerns and apply resources to them, thereby increasing the effectiveness of 
both the assistance and the public diplomacy.   Psychological operations, a capability 
residing in the U.S. military, would be extremely useful in conducting target area analysis 
to develop the important themes that could be incorporated into the various assistance 
programs.  Moreover, psychological operations personnel could work with Uzbekistani 




The military element is at the same time the most important and least important 
element of national power in relation to the U.S. FID effort in Uzbekistan.  It is the least 
important in that, aside from being an accessible labor pool to assist in humanitarian 
assistance and public projects, the military is the least usable element of national power.  
The military’s purpose is to be prepared to violently resolve situations that the other 
elements of national power are not able to redress.  Ideally, the military should never 
have to be used; making the resources applied to the military element of national power a 
rather expensive insurance policy.  However, the military is also the most important 
element of national power in that: a) the military deters insurgent activity, b) the military 
provides a sense of security, and c) the military protects the investment by the other 
elements of national power.  Furthermore, irresponsible military action completely erases 
any gains the government makes toward becoming more responsive via other elements of 
national power.  Therefore, emphasis on the military element of national power is well 
founded. 
The U.S. has been successful in its military engagement efforts with Uzbekistan.  
At the same time, I stated that there is no overall plan for proactively assisting Uzbekistan 
with improving its military.  This could be initially addressed by establishing a small, 
near-continuous presence of U.S. special operations forces.  Currently, improving its 
special operation forces is of utmost importance to Uzbekistan (JSCC).  A small 
contingent of U.S. special operations forces could serve in a train-the-trainer role for 
establishing a training program for Uzbekistani special operations forces.  Lessons 
learned could establish the basis for creating similar programs focused on officer 
development, non-commissioned officer development, and eventually basic training.  In a 
relatively short period of time, U.S. special operations forces could have a significant 
impact on the entire indoctrination process of Uzbekistani soldiers.  As I previously 
pointed out, the effects of a professional military, imparted with democratic values, in a 
country with compulsory military service would affect nearly every segment of society.    
I also exaggerated when I described the military as the least usable element of 
national power.  The military has many assets, in addition to its use as a labor pool, that 
are useful in FID.  It has expertise in the realms of engineering, transportation, water 
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purification, civil affairs, psychological operations, and medical, among others.  These 
assets could easily be effectively employed in an intensive FID effort.  Furthermore, in 
areas of insurgent activity, where there is need for an ongoing military presence, the 
conduct of soldiers and the military is critical to retaining popular support.  A 
professional, well-equipped, well-fed, and well-supported military will understand the 
political importance of maintaining popular support and will not be forced to rely on 
scavenging the local area for the materials it needs to conduct its operations.  For these 
reasons it is necessary to increase engagement with, and offer direct support to, the 
military in Uzbekistan and ensure proper integration of the military into the FID effort.   
D. CONCLUSION 
I have barely scratched the surface of the potential programs of a well-structured 
U.S. FID effort in Uzbekistan.  However, I have elaborated on the concept enough that 
the benefits are obvious.  In the process I have undoubtedly ignored many potential 
contributing factors.  In a way, the fact that I am not solely capable of devising “the 
solution” underlines my main point.  Current U.S. assistance does not adequately address 
the root cause of problems in Uzbekistan and relies on a too narrow set of tools to 
accomplish our objectives.  A full-time, dedicated IDAD-FID organization would have 
the time and expertise to analyze the problems in depth in concert with the Uzbekistanis,  
and would bring necessary experience to bear to identify, and then reach for, the 
appropriate tool.   
Admittedly, I have neglected how U.S. FID could be integrated with assistance 
from other countries.  This is a difficult subject and requires more study.  A FID effort of 
the type described signals a significant strengthening of U.S.-Uzbekistani ties.  As 
discussed in Chapter II, the geopolitical landscape in Uzbekistan is diverse, and such a 
move by the U.S. would certainly have diplomatic ramifications on our relationships with 
other countries that have interests in Uzbekistan.  Additionally, my analysis is that, given 
the option, Uzbekistan would choose U.S. assistance to the exclusion of assistance from 
others, if the U.S. offer were resolute.  The FID organization could prove valuable in 
preventing just such an occurrence.  By offering to assist other nations in providing 
assistance in the most efficient and effective manner, the FID organization could be a 
valuable partnership program which would help to defuse geopolitical tensions in the 
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region.  I would, however, caution against internationalizing the decision-making 
authority in such an arrangement due to the fact that the U.S. does have vital and strategic 
interests to secure.  Deterrence and coercion theory aside, strengthening our hand is far 
more valuable in this case than relying on a secondary effect of someone else’s action to 
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VII.     CONCLUSION 
It is too easy and too tempting to be critical of U.S. foreign policy, in a large 
measure because it is simply impossible to satisfy the diverse opinions that our 
democratic system promotes, while the process of conducting foreign policy is itself 
unmanageably complex.  Thus, my intent in this thesis has been to go beyond mere 
criticism.  Although it might seem easy to draw the conclusion from my arguments that I 
strongly disapprove of U.S. foreign policy in regard to Uzbekistan, or even lack faith in 
the ability of the system to act competently, nothing could be further from the truth.  I 
have had the unique opportunity to witness, at a low level, the difficult process of 
diplomacy and foreign policy in action in Uzbekistan and hold the officials responsible 
for the process in the highest regard.  However, my training as a Special Forces officer 
has also taught me to view things from a slightly different perspective, one that I believe 
is particularly appropriate in Uzbekistan.  My assumption is that in the foreign policy 
process – fraught with political maneuvering, compromise, and concern with secondary 
effects – sometimes the simplest solutions get overlooked or discounted.  Ergo my 
application of insurgency theory, notably because the government of Uzbekistan itself is 
overwhelmingly concerned with insurgency – almost to a fault – but because in our 
counterinsurgency doctrine we not only have the framework necessary to secure our 
national interests, but also to properly address Uzbekistanis concerns, creating a more 
democratic society in the process.  By outlining the concept of FID as contained in Joint 
Pub 3-07.1 my aim has been to bring some attention to this neglected subject.  Honestly, 
when I began this project I had no idea that the ideal solution would come out of a 
military publication.  At the same time, I believed that the ideal solution would have to 
have more of a military flavor to it than is currently the case.  After countless hours of 
digesting congressional testimony, national security literature, foreign policy documents, 
and academic analyses I am convinced that we have the means for helping Uzbekistan 
address both its needs and ours via our counterinsurgency doctrine.   
Without a doubt, the U.S. has significant national interests at stake in Central Asia 
and Uzbekistan.  These interests go beyond the current “War on Terror” and have 
significant bearing on our diplomatic relations with Russia, China, and the Middle East.  
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The costs of not implementing a policy capable of securing our national interests are 
severe: interregional conflict could involve the use of nuclear weapons.  Intraregional 
conflict would further destabilize Central Asia and lead to an interregional conflict. 
Proliferation of WMD materials, technology, and knowledge would erode the 
responsibility that is inherent in WMD ownership and threaten the world order.  Failing 
to address ecological, economic, and social problems exacerbates instability.  And idly 
watching for the development of democratic institutions only ensures that this will never 
happen.  To avoid any and all of these scenarios requires the U.S. to adjust the policy of 
making meaningful assistance to Uzbekistan contingent upon rapid, measurable reform in 
democracy, economics, and human rights.  U.S. interests will be much better served by a 
policy that fully embraces Uzbekistan, and provides consistent – not contingent – 
assistance towards attaining these goals.  In becoming a dependable partner, the U.S. will 
gain influence over Uzbekistan’s development in a manner that is congruent with U.S. 
interests and principles.   
The primary threat to stability and development in Uzbekistan is insurgency – at 
the moment by the IMU.  While legitimate arguments can be made that the IMU is 
incapable of taking over the country and that government overreaction is only making the 
problem worse, the fact remains that the government of Uzbekistan takes the threat 
seriously.  Understanding insurgency theory justifies these concerns and provides insight 
regarding the logic of the government’s counterinsurgency efforts.  Defeating the 
insurgent threat in Uzbekistan is not an unmanageable proposition; in fact, it appears 
much easier than our successful efforts in El Salvador.  However, it requires resources 
and an understanding that the government of Uzbekistan currently lacks.  The U.S. is 
uniquely qualified to fill this void.  In light of September 11, 2001, this historic 
opportunity to humanely assist in the development of Uzbekistan while securing our 
national interests is not one to be squandered.   
The FID framework, presented in Joint Pub 3-07.1, expertly combines U.S. policy 
and effective organization to focus on a realistic goal.  It enables the U.S. to definitively 
secure national interests while addressing Uzbekistan’s primary concern.  Through 
effectively integrating the diplomatic, economic, informational, and military elements of 
national power, the FID framework provides a strategy for addressing a wide range of 
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issues while maintaining economy of scale and unity of effort.  By inculcating the 
government of Uzbekistan with the principles and functions of IDAD, the FID 
framework establishes the basis for continued development of a responsive and effective 
government founded on democratic principles.  Additionally, the resolve displayed by the 
U.S. in establishing such an effort alleviates Uzbekistan’s concerns about weathering the 
storm of reform alone.  This in and of itself may represent enough of an impetus for 
Uzbekistan to willingly begin the reformation process that it knows is long overdue.   
Development of a fully functional U.S. FID organization in Uzbekistan is only 
possible with interagency cooperation.  The participants in this process should have an 
understanding of the concepts that I have presented in this thesis as well as an expertise 
about how their particular functional areas add value to the FID effort.  While 
personalities and relationships among members of the organization are likely to 
determine its effectiveness, leadership is critical to the success of this proposal.  Strong 
organizational leadership skills are imperative, but they are not paramount.  The leader 
must also have a depth of knowledge about each of the elements of national power, the 
stature necessary to effectively function in a diverse and dynamic political environment, 
as well as willingness to remain intimately engaged in the process at the nuts and bolts 
level.  Finally, based on personal experience, the military must have full-time 
representation in the organization.  Aside from the functional utility of the military in 
FID, the U.S. military is well respected in Uzbekistan and this influence should be used 
to open doors that may otherwise remain closed.      
Adopting FID in Uzbekistan would enable the U.S. to actively assist and guide 
Uzbekistan in overcoming many of its internal development challenges.  As I mentioned 
in the introduction, this is a precondition for achieving regional stability, which should be 
the ultimate goal of the U.S.  The counterinsurgency strategy of the FID framework that I 
have presented here may or may not be applicable to the other countries in the region.  
However, the FID framework itself is flexible, and by conducting an accurate analysis of 
the challenges facing other countries in the region, it should be possible to adapt it to 
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